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Local Power
Alexandra B. Klass *
Rebecca Wilton **
This Article is about “local power.” We use that term in two distinct but
complementary ways. First, local power describes the authority of local
governments to enact regulatory policies in the interests of their citizens. Second,
local power describes the authority of local governments to exercise proprietary
control over the sources and delivery of electric power to their citizens. This dual
meaning of local power is particularly important today, as an increasing
number of local governments are seriously considering “municipalizing”—
taking control of local electric power systems—at the same time that, outside the
electric power sector, many states are constraining local regulatory power by
displacing or “preempting” local initiatives in a broad range of environmental,
economic, and social policy arenas.
Building on this dual meaning of local power, this Article constructs a
new and important link between two existing bodies of legal scholarship: (1)
state and local government law, with a focus on the recent, aggressive state
preemption of local environmental, economic, and social regulatory policies,
and (2) energy law, with a focus on the broad authority that exists in virtually
every state for local governments to act in a proprietary capacity to control the
generation and delivery of electric power to their citizens to meet a broad range
of economic, environmental, political, social, and racial equity goals. In
establishing this new connection between the two scholarly fields, we illustrate
how local communities’ exercise of control over electric power systems creates a
potential safe harbor from the well-documented trend of increased state
preemption of local regulatory authority in many states across the country. This
creates opportunities for local governments to use their long-standing
proprietary powers to supply electricity to their citizens as a means to meet many
of the same economic, environmental protection, and social and racial equity
goals they have historically attempted to achieve through traditional
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regulation. This analysis also provides a new perspective on the renewed
scholarly debates over “localism” and shows how local control over power
systems can counteract historic parochialism concerns associated with
renewable energy projects that are critical to a U.S. clean energy transition.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article is about “local power.” We use that term in two
distinct but complementary ways. First, local power describes the
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authority of local governments to enact regulatory policies in the
interests of their citizens. 1 Second, local power describes the authority
of local governments to exercise proprietary control over the sources
and delivery of electric power to their citizens. Exploration of this dual
meaning of local power has important theoretical and practical
implications because it allows a focus on local governments beyond their
traditional regulatory capacity. It creates opportunities to consider local
governments as providers of a critical service—electricity—that today
is laden with many of the same economic, environmental protection,
and social and racial equity goals local governments may
simultaneously attempt to achieve through traditional regulation.
This inquiry is particularly important as an increasing number
of local governments consider “municipalizing”—taking control of local
electric power systems from private, investor-owned utilities 2 to
advance goals that include lower power prices; reduced greenhouse gas
(“GHG”) emissions; improved customer service, accountability, and
transparency; job creation; “energy democracy”; 3 and “energy justice.” 4
Moreover, this growing interest in municipalization is taking place at
the same time that, outside the electric power sector, many states are
actively constraining local regulatory power by displacing or
“preempting” local initiatives in a broad range of environmental,
economic, and social policy arenas. 5

1.
This formulation draws on Richard Schragger’s definition of “city power” as both “the
city’s formal authority to engage in particular activities” as well as “the city’s actual capacity to
govern—its ability through its policies to improve the material well-being of its citizens.” RICHARD
SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER: URBAN GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL AGE 1 (2016). Throughout this Article,
we use the terms “local governments,” “municipal corporations,” “cities,” and “subnational
governments” to refer to the exercise of legislative power and, in some cases, proprietary authority,
by nonstate and nonfederal governmental authorities. We recognize that in other contexts not
relevant to this Article, these terms may have very different meanings from one another and are
not as easily interchangeable. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and
Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 347 (1990) (stating that the term “city” is “a political,
economic and social concept that conjures up associations with respect to size, economics, politics,
social life and history that the blander ‘local government’ does not”).
2.
See infra Part I.A (defining and discussing investor-owned utilities).
3.
See infra notes 232–237 and accompanying text (defining and discussing energy
democracy).
4.
See infra note 307 and accompanying text (defining and discussing energy justice).
5.
See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, The Dilemma of Localism in an Era of Polarization, 128
YALE L.J. 954, 957 (2019) (“As rising political and cultural polarization exacerbates long-standing
urban/rural conflicts, . . . progressive cities find themselves increasingly at odds with conservative
state legislatures. . . . States in recent years have preempted local initiatives and removed local
authority across a wide array of policy domains.”); Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New
Preemption, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1995, 1997 (2018) (“This decade has witnessed the emergence and
rapid spread of a new and aggressive form of state preemption of local government action. . . . The
rise of the new preemption is closely connected to the interacting polarizations of Republican and
Democrat, conservative and liberal, and nonurban and urban.”).
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Building on this dual meaning of local power, this Article
constructs a new and important link between two existing bodies of
legal scholarship: (1) state and local government law, with a focus on
the recent, aggressive state legislative preemption of local
environmental, economic, and social regulatory policies, and (2) energy
law, with a focus on the broad authority that exists in virtually every
state for local governments to “municipalize,” or act in a proprietary
capacity to control the generation and delivery of electricity to their
citizens to meet a broad range of economic, environmental, political, and
social policy goals. 6 In creating this new link between these two fields
of legal study, we illustrate how local communities’ exercise of control
over electric power resources and delivery creates a potential safe
harbor from increased state preemption of local policy initiatives.
Moreover, this analysis provides a new perspective on the
renewed scholarly debates over “localism” in response to contemporary
state preemption actions arising from increased political polarization
between states and local governments. 7 When local governments
exercise their power to municipalize—either to actually create a
municipal electric utility or to use their authority to do so as a
bargaining chip in negotiations with the existing investor-owned
utility—it provides a powerful platform for local policy development and
experimentation that poses less risk of parochialism and other concerns
historically associated with localism. 8

6.
See, e.g., Johanna Bozuwa, Energy Democracy: Taking Back Power, NEXT SYS. PROJECT
7–10 (Feb. 2019), https://thenextsystem.org/sites/default/files/2019-03/EnergyDemocracy-2-starFinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/53FE-XNNF] (discussing how proponents of contemporary
municipalization efforts are relying on “energy democracy” principles that include embracing
renewable energy, greater citizen political participation in energy system decisions, progressive
economic ideals surrounding energy such as community ownership, wealth distribution, and
diversity in leadership); OFF. OF THE N.Y.C. PUB. ADVOC., MUNICIPALIZING NEW YORK CITY’S
ELECTRIC
GRID
16–19
(Aug.
7,
2020),
https://www.pubadvocate.nyc.gov/static/assets/Municipal%20Grid%20Report_OPA.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5FAL-NXHA] (advocating for a New York City municipal utility and including
among its goals: “accountability to the people it serves,” the ability to operate independently from
“outside” corporate or governmental authority and instead be accountable to a directly elected local
board, a “just transition for all utility workers,” and a “just and expeditious transition to a
renewable energy future while keeping costs to the ratepayer down”).
7.
See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1990) (“The scholarly proponents of greater local power—what I will call
‘localism’—make their case in terms of economic efficiency, education for public life and popular
political empowerment—a striking harmonization of the otherwise divergent values of the free
market, civic republicanism and critical legal studies.”); see also Davidson, supra note 5, at 958–
60, 963–64 (describing resurgence of interest in localism and scholarly debates over the same);
BRUCE KATZ & JEREMY NOWAK, THE NEW LOCALISM: HOW CITIES CAN THRIVE IN THE AGE OF
POPULISM 4–6 (2017) (defining and exploring “new localism”); infra Part III.
8.
See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 7, at 1 (“Localism reflects territorial economic and social
inequalities and reinforces them with political power. Its benefits accrue primarily to a minority
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It is widely recognized that as political polarization has become
more widespread throughout the United States, conflicts have
increased significantly between states and the cities within them. 9 In
recent years, cities across the country have enacted a broad range of
progressive environmental, social, and economic policies in response to
the desires of their citizens. These include GHG emission reduction
policies, 10 plastic bag bans, 11 restrictions on oil and gas hydraulic
fracturing (or “fracking”) operations, 12 protection for the LGBTQ
community in housing and employment, 13 “living wage” ordinances and
other workplace protections, 14 restrictions on the use of natural gas in
new building construction in favor of decarbonized electricity, 15 and the
like. These policies build on a long history of progressive local
policymaking, particularly when it comes to protecting the health and
economic well-being of local citizens as well as, in some instances,
protecting racial minorities within the community. 16
of affluent localities, to the detriment of other communities and to the system of local government
as a whole.”); see also infra Part III.
9.
See, e.g., RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 358 (8th ed. 2016) (discussing range of disputes between states and local
governments on “ ‘hot button’ issues where the circumstances or political preferences of local
residents, particularly in big cities, diverge significantly from those of the rest of the state” and
citing, in particular, local regulation of guns and LGBTQ rights).
10. Katrina M. Wyman & Danielle Spiegel-Feld, The Urban Environmental Renaissance, 108
CALIF. L. REV. 305, 309–11, app. a (2020) (discussing city environmental ordinances and initiatives
to reduce GHG emissions and plastic waste); see also infra Part I.A (discussing local ordinances
and litigation over the same).
11. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
12. Hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking,” refers to extraction techniques developed in Texas in
the 1990s to obtain oil and gas resources from shale rock and tight sandstones. These techniques
involve pumping large quantities of water, chemicals, and “proppants” (like sand) into a subsurface
well at high pressure—first vertically and then horizontally (a practice known as “directional
drilling”)—to create fissures or “fractures” in the rock that allow the oil and gas to flow back up
through the well for recovery. See ALEXANDRA B. KLASS & HANNAH J. WISEMAN, ENERGY LAW 47
(2d ed. 2020) (discussing the fracking process); see also infra notes 53–56, 62 and accompanying
text (discussing local fracking bans and litigation over the same).
13. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
14. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 9, at 375–76 (discussing legal challenges to
municipal living wage ordinances and municipal enhanced sick leave ordinances based on state
preemption of local authority); see also infra note 59 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., R.A. Lenhardt, Localities as Equality Innovators, 7 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 265, 269
(2011) (discussing why local governments have the institutional capacity and experience to create
innovative policies to address racial inequality); Davidson, supra note 5, at 974–78 (discussing
local governments as historic centers of policy experimentation and summarizing scholarly debates
over localism, parochialism, and the appropriate balance of power between states and local
governments); Wyman & Spiegel-Feld, supra note 10, at 312–18 (discussing early efforts by cities
to reduce smoke and smog and provide citizens with clean water and waste disposal services);
Lauren E. Phillips, Note, Impeding Innovation: State Preemption of Progressive Local Regulations,
117 COLUM. L. REV. 2225, 2238 (2017) (discussing literature on role of cities in civil rights
movement and stating that “[l]ocal governments are closely connected to their constituents and
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However, states can pose often insurmountable barriers to
progressive local policy development. While cities today increasingly
reflect a more concentrated population of progressive, diverse, welleducated constituencies, the same is not true for many states. These
“red states” often embrace countervailing policies designed to reduce
regulations, lower taxes, and respond to more rural and, in many cases,
conservative constituencies. 17 As a result, when local governments
enact environmental, energy, social, and economic policy, a frequent
response by states is to displace or “preempt” those policies by
legislation in favor of a statewide ban on local government initiatives in
the regulatory area in question. 18 While state preemption of local policy
choices is nothing new, the scope and intensity of preemption has
increased in recent years in parallel with the rise of political
polarization across the country between urban and rural areas,
educated and less educated voters, and white and minority citizens. 19
Richard Briffault has described this “new” preemption as
including both “punitive preemption”—imposing significant financial
penalties on local governments and local government officials for policy
choices disfavored by the state legislature; and “nuclear preemption”—
eliminating entirely the power of local governments to regulate without
express state permission. 20 One might add to these new forms of
preemption “anticipatory preemption”—states preempting local
governments from taking a particular policy action before they have
even considered adopting it in order to send a warning to local

thus may be better able to experiment with solutions to a variety of issues affecting local
communities, particularly socioeconomic inequality and discrimination”); Matthew J.
Parlow, Progressive Policy-Making on the Local Level: Rethinking Traditional Notions of
Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 371, 373 (2008) (“[L]ocal governments can be viewed as
perhaps the most critical level of government in terms of responding—through regulation, goods,
or services—to the needs and wants of its constituents.”). But see Davidson, supra note 5, at 976–
78 (discussing critiques of “localism” that include the tendency of local governments to “foster
exclusion,” engage in parochialism, and create negative externalities with their policy choices).
17. See infra Part I.B.
18. See infra Part I.B.
19. See NICOLE DUPUIS, TREVOR LANGAN, CHRISTINA MCFARLAND, ANGELINA PANETTIERI &
BROOKS RAINWATER, NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, CITY RIGHTS IN AN ERA OF PREEMPTION: A STATEBY-STATE ANALYSIS
3 (2018), https://www.nlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/NLC-SMLPreemption-Report-2017-pages.pdf [https://perma.cc/9F88-CNE2] (“State legislatures have gotten
more aggressive in their use of preemption in recent years. Explanations for this increase include
lobbying efforts by special interests, spatial sorting of political preferences between urban and
rural areas, and single party dominance in most state governments.”).
20. Briffault, supra note 5, at 1997; see also Richard Schragger, The Attack on American
Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1163, 1164, 1182–83 (2018) (“The last few years have witnessed an explosion
of preemptive state legislation challenging and overriding municipal ordinances across a wide
range of policy areas.”).

2022]

LOCAL POWER

99

governments not to follow the lead of cities in other states. 21 Responding
to these state legislative trends, Richard Schragger declared in 2018
that “American cities are under attack” due to an “explosion” of state
laws preempting a broad range of local policies, often “accompanied by
an increasingly shrill anti-urban politics.” 22 Nestor Davidson observed
in 2019 that “[t]his wave of preemption reflects a mix of deregulatory
libertarianism—particularly focused on employment, the environment,
and technology—and social conservatives’ concerns about religious
liberty and reducing immigration, forming a shared agenda of reducing
local power.” 23 In many instances, these state deregulatory agendas
follow intense lobbying by regulated businesses as well as by interest
groups like the American Legislative Exchange Council (“ALEC”). 24
Because the U.S. Constitution makes no mention of cities and
grants them no independent authority, local governments are
dependent on state constitutions and state statutes for their
authority. 25 Thus, when local government policies conflict with state
policies, courts generally invalidate the local policy. 26 Since many of the
local governments enacting these progressive policies represent large
percentages of minority citizens, the elimination of local government
21. See, e.g., Amy Turner, Municipal Natural Gas Bans: Round 2 (The Evolution of State
Preemption Law), COLUM. L. SCH. SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L.: CLIMATE L. BLOG (July 29,
2020),
http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2020/07/29/municipal-natural-gas-bansround-2-the-evolution-of-state-preemption-law/ [https://perma.cc/WW75-UJPV] (reporting on
increasing number of local governments banning natural gas connections in new buildings and
state legislative responses to the same); see also Phillips, supra note 16, at 2244–45 (discussing
the Ohio legislature’s ban on local government ordinances that would increase the minimum wage
within their borders before any such increases were enacted and an Arizona law preempting local
governments from giving workers rights with regard to setting work schedules prior to the
enactment of any local ordinances on the topic).
22. Schragger, supra note 20, at 1164.
23. Davidson, supra note 5, at 964.
24. See, e.g., Schragger, supra note 20, at 1170 (noting that “[i]n many cases, there appears
to be a partnership between the private interests that seek to avoid local regulation and legislators
at the state level”); Briffault, supra note 5, at 1997 (stating that new preemption measures are
“[o]ften propelled by trade association and business lobbying”). As described on its website, ALEC
is “America’s largest nonpartisan, voluntary membership organization of state legislators
dedicated to the principles of limited government, free markets and federalism” and provides
model legislation to member legislators on a range of subjects including criminal justice, workplace
regulation, environmental protection, energy, education, and free speech. See About ALEC, AM.
LEGIS. EXCH. COUNCIL, https://www.alec.org/about/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/GPT8-EYSQ].
25. See, e.g., BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 9, at 73 (discussing lack of U.S.
constitutional status for local governments and discussing the three approaches to the appropriate
legal role for local governments—(1) as state instrumentalities, (2) as de facto autonomy coupled
with “a normative commitment to local self-governance,” and (3) as quasi-proprietary firms similar
to business corporations); SCHRAGGER, supra note 1, at 80–81 (“The bottom line is that, as a
general matter, cities are constitutionally subordinate to states, and thus states are mostly
unrestrained by U.S. constitutional law in limiting cities’ formal powers.”).
26. See infra Parts I.A and I.B (discussing state-local authority and preemption).
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authority in favor of state authority transfers political power away from
minority citizens in favor of white citizens who hold more power on a
statewide basis. 27
However, there is one area where local governments have
exercised authority with the blessing of states and the federal
government for over a century—the power to take control of their
electricity systems. The authority of local governments to
“municipalize” and create locally owned, not-for-profit, self-regulating
electric utilities is reflected in all but one state’s laws or constitution. 28
Cities in both “red states” and “blue states” and led by both Republican
and Democratic mayors and city councils have taken advantage of their
authority to municipalize for a broad range of policy objectives that
include lowering power costs; promoting local autonomy and democratic
self-determination; addressing dissatisfaction with the existing
investor-owned utility serving the community; and, increasingly,
reducing GHG emissions and addressing social and economic equity
goals. 29
Municipal utilities exist in Los Angeles, California; Austin,
Texas; Cleveland, Ohio; Seattle, Washington; Omaha, Nebraska; and
thousands of small cities and towns across the country. 30 When a local
government chooses to municipalize and provide electricity services to
its citizens, rather than contract those services out through a franchise
agreement with a private, investor-owned electric utility, state law
generally provides that the city itself, not the state public utility
commission, becomes the sole regulator of electricity prices and

27. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1748 (2005)
(explaining that “[d]isaggregated institutions create the opportunity for global minorities to
constitute local majorities” and “thus allow dissenters to decide, to act on behalf of the state”);
HUNTER BLAIR, DAVID COOPER, JULIA WOLFE & JAIMIE WORKER, ECON. POL’Y INST., PREEMPTING
PROGRESS
2
(2020),
https://www.epi.org/publication/preemption-in-the-south/
[https://perma.cc/DUD4-LUW8] (“Through preemption, state lawmakers [in the South] have
obstructed local communities—often majority-Black-and-Brown communities—from responding to
the expressed needs and values of their residents through policies strengthening workers’ rights.”);
Briffault, supra note 5, at 2009 (“Some preemption measures have the effect of shifting
decisionmaking authority from majority-minority local governments to a white-dominated state
government.”).
28. See infra Part I.D (all states except Hawaii include the power for local governments to
municipalize).
29. See infra Part II.B (discussing public power goals).
30. Stats and Facts, AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, https://www.publicpower.org/public-power/statsand-facts (last visited Dec. 21, 2021) [https://perma.cc/2DTG-FCTK]; AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, 2020
STATISTICAL REPORT (2020), https://www.publicpower.org/system/files/documents/2020-PublicPower-Statistical-Report_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/J46M-D74H]; Public Power for Your Community,
AM.
PUB.
POWER
ASS’N
12
(2016),
https://www.publicpower.org/system/files/documents/municipalizationpublic_power_for_your_community.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XH5-FQDS].
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services. 31 In other words, when a local government exerts its power to
municipalize, state authority decreases rather than increases,
providing significant local government autonomy to achieve
environmental, social, and economic goals through its power systems. 32
Moreover, as a matter of state and local government law, when
a city takes action through its municipal electric utility, it is acting in
its “proprietary” capacity rather than its regulatory capacity and thus
has far more autonomy from the state with regard to policies, revenues,
contracts, and property rights. 33 Once created, the local utility has
physical assets, long-term power purchase contracts, employees,
constituents in the form of local electricity customers, and a durable
governance structure. There is limited formal authority or political will
for a state to interfere with a local government’s decisions regarding the
delivery of power to citizens. In other words, once a local utility creates
a physical and regulatory framework for delivery of electric power, that
structure can serve as a platform for pursuing a broad range of local
goals relating to energy, environmental protection, economic security,
social equity, and democratic participation.
As Shelley Welton has documented, many current
municipalization efforts “reclaim public ownership as a method of
implementing social policy” consistent with “the Progressive-era history
of municipalization in the United States” as well as more contemporary
policy efforts to address climate change. 34 She suggests that local
control over electricity systems provides a potential for local
governments to “gain more say in setting priorities for their electricity
systems, be they economic development or environmental goals” such
as encouraging locally sourced power or “to keep jobs and resources
within the community.” 35 Likewise, Uma Outka has argued that a
transition to locally owned power provides “the possibility for
reinvention” of the delivery of electricity, providing citizens with low
carbon power as well as “new modes of delivering energy services.” 36
Finally, Shalanda Baker has recognized that these energy policy

31. For example, municipal utilities in Minnesota are self-regulating unless they actively
elect to become subject to regulation by the public utilities commission. MINN. STAT. § 216B.025
(2021). The law is similar in many other states. See infra Part II.A.
32. See, e.g., Wyman & Spiegel-Feld, supra note 10, at 340 & n.219 (recognizing that cities
with municipal utilities have greater control over their energy generation mix than cities in
franchise agreements with investor-owned utilities, allowing cities with municipal utilities to
regulate the “supply side of the economy” in addition to the “demand side”); infra Part II.A.
33. See infra Part I.C.
34. Shelley Welton, Public Energy, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 270 (2017).
35. Shelley Welton, Grasping for Energy Democracy, 116 MICH. L. REV. 581, 586 (2018).
36. Uma Outka, Cities and the Low-Carbon Grid, 46 ENV’T L. 105, 109–10 (2016).
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choices can shape “every single aspect of life, particularly for poor
people and people of color.” 37
This momentum in favor of creating local utilities to serve a
growing variety of economic and social welfare goals has extended
beyond cities to Indian tribes. An increasing number of tribal leaders
have expressed interest in creating tribal utilities to achieve many of
the same economic, political, and environmental protection goals in the
name of “energy sovereignty.” 38 Tribal leaders have articulated goals
that include lowering electricity costs, reducing GHG emissions, taking
control over power supplies, enhancing local sovereignty and selfgovernance, and using the tribal utility to promote on-site clean energy
generation and local job creation. 39 In this way, “local power” extends
beyond local governments to encompass a broader range of governing
authorities using power systems to transform their communities.
Part I provides a brief summary of state and local government
regulatory authority, followed by a discussion of contemporary actions
by states to preempt local government regulatory initiatives in a
growing number of economic, environmental, and social policy arenas.
It ends with a discussion of the circumstances under which local
governments can act in a “proprietary” or business-like capacity—

37. SHALANDA H. BAKER, REVOLUTIONARY POWER: AN ACTIVIST’S GUIDE TO THE ENERGY
TRANSITION 30 (2021).
38. See, e.g., Pilar M. Thomas, Tribal Utility Development: Energy Development and Services
on Tribal Land, ARIZ. ATT’Y 26, 26–28 (2019); see also 17 Tribes Awarded Federal Grants to
Support
Energy
Sovereignty,
TRIBAL
BUS.
NEWS
(Dec.
9,
2020),
https://tribalbusinessnews.com/sections/energy/13265-17-tribes-awarded-federal-grants-tosupport-energy-sovereignty [https://perma.cc/SA9L-48NS] (reporting on Tribal Energy
Development Capacity program that “will go toward bolstering tribes’ managerial and
institutional capacity to develop energy resources, as well as develop the organizational and
business structures to manage those projects”); Tribal Utility Formation: Three Key Considerations
ENERGY,
for
Tribal
Electric
Utility
Formation,
AVANT
https://www.avantenergy.com/2018/02/tribal-utility-formation-three-key-considerations-tribalelectric-utility-formation/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2021) [https://perma.cc/4E5N-SSAH] (“A tribal
electric utility gives the Tribe the authority to decide how to generate or procure power, how to
invest in tribal infrastructure, and how to provide customer service to electric customers on
Reservation.”); infra Part II.B.
39. See Frank Jossi, Crowdfunded Solar Puts Red Lake Nation on a Path to Energy
Sovereignty,
ENERGY
NEWS
NETWORK
(Nov.
13,
2020),
https://energynews.us/2020/11/13/crowdfunded-solar-puts-red-lake-nation-on-a-path-to-energysovereignty/ [https://perma.cc/7P79-GFAF] (tribal member stating that creating a tribal utility for
the Red Lake Nation in Minnesota will “eventually pay off in energy self-sufficiency, higher-paying
jobs and a healthier psychological and physical environment”); RENEWABLE RES. PROGRAM, W.
AREA POWER ADMIN., TRIBAL AUTHORITY PROCESS CASE STUDIES: THE CONVERSION OF ONRESERVATION ELECTRIC UTILITIES TO TRIBAL OWNERSHIP AND OPERATION, at iii (2010),
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2016/04/f30/tribal_authority_case_studies_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TM2T-QEGT] (documenting existing tribal utilities in the United States and
reasons for creation, including increased self-determination and economic growth); infra Part II.B.
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including as an electric utility—and in that way avoid some of the power
of states to displace local policy choices.
Part II explores the history of local efforts to take control of the
generation and delivery of electricity to citizens through
municipalization and the economic, environmental, political, and social
equity rationales underlying local power campaigns. It also details how
these local power campaigns have extended to Indian tribes seeking
“energy sovereignty” to accomplish similar economic, environmental,
and social justice goals.
Part III returns to the distinct but complementary meanings of
“local power.” It illustrates in more detail how local communities’
exercise of control over electric power resources and delivery can create
a potential safe harbor from increased state preemption of local
authority in other contexts. Moreover, this analysis provides a new
perspective on the renewed scholarly debates over “localism” and the
concerns of local government parochialism. 40 In the energy context,
parochialism concerns often take the form of local government
opposition to solar, wind, and other renewable energy projects critically
needed for a U.S. energy transition to address global climate change.
While in the past scholars and regulators have turned to state
preemption to address these “not-in-my-backyard” or “NIMBY”
concerns in the energy sector, another option is increased local
ownership of energy systems. Such an increase in “local power” has the
potential to overcome parochialism concerns in the energy sector by
enhancing the economic and participatory benefits associated with new
energy projects in the community.
I. LOCAL POWER I: LOCAL REGULATORY AUTHORITY AND LIMITS
This Part provides a basic explanation of the division of power
between state and local governments in the U.S. constitutional system.
Section A explains how as a federal constitutional matter, local
governments have no protected status or rights. States have granted
local governments extensive authority to regulate within their borders
through their state constitutions and statutes. Still, states have the
power to displace or “preempt” such local laws when they choose.
Section B describes how state legislatures have increasingly preempted
local laws on a range of environmental, economic, and social policy
issues. Moreover, these state legislative actions are more punitive and
sweeping than in the past, reflecting increased political polarization
between states and local governments. Importantly, though, as
40. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 5, at 975–83 (describing scholarly debates).
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described in Section C, for over a century courts and commentators have
recognized that local governments have significantly greater autonomy
when they act in their private or “proprietary” capacity rather than in
their regulatory capacity. Notably, one of the ways in which a local
government acts in its private or proprietary capacity is when it creates
and operates a municipal electric utility. Section D summarizes state
constitutions and laws governing the formation and operation of
municipal utilities, while Section E highlights court decisions that
illustrate the surprising scope and strength of local power when cities
act in their capacity as municipal utilities.
A. Home Rule, Local Authority, and State Preemption
The U.S. Constitution contains specific grants of authority for
the federal government and preserves plenary authority for the states,
but says nothing at all about local governments. 41 In 1907, the U.S.
Supreme Court declared in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh that cities are
political subdivisions of the state, “created as convenient agencies” for
exercising governmental powers the state entrusts to them, but that the
state “at its pleasure, may modify or withdraw all such powers,” take
their property without compensation, reduce or eliminate their
territory, or destroy them entirely all “with or without the consent of
the citizens, or even against their protest.” 42 According to the Court,
such actions are allowable because “in all these respects the state is
supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action to the state
Constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the
Constitution of the United States.” 43 In its decision, the Supreme Court
weighed in on an active debate over whether the Constitution contained
any right to local self-government. It ultimately sided with the position
of legal scholar and Iowa Supreme Court Justice John Dillon, who
contended that local governments had no authority apart from that
expressly given to them under state law. 44 The opposing view,
championed by Justice Thomas Cooley of the Michigan Supreme Court,
relied on early American history and local practice to argue that local

41. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.”). See generally BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 9, at 73–74 (“The Constitution is
utterly silent on the subject of local government.”).
42. 207 U.S. 161, 178–79 (1907) (affirming lower court decision consolidating the cities of
Pittsburgh and Allegheny upon a positive vote of the citizens of Pittsburgh, a negative vote of the
citizens of Allegheny, and state legislative action ordering the consolidation).
43. Id. at 179.
44. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 9, at 79, 326–29 (citing legal authorities).
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government autonomy should be protected as a matter of state
constitutional law or at least as a matter of historical practice. 45
Since that time, courts and commentators have used “Dillon’s
Rule” as “a standard of delegation, a canon of construction, and a rule
of limited power” that reflects the view that local governments have
only the powers that the state expressly grants them or that can be
fairly implied from powers the state has expressly granted. 46 This
served to limit the number of governmental entities that could regulate
private conduct; if it was unclear whether the local government had
authority to act, courts resolved any uncertainty against the local
government. 47
From the outset, however, local governments pushed back
against Dillon’s Rule and advocated for their states to adopt what
became known as “home rule” authority for local governments. States
responded beginning in 1875 with amendments to their state
constitutions providing local governments with the power to regulate in
certain policy areas even in the absence of express state authority.
Today, the vast majority of states have a constitutional provision or
statute granting at least some local governments home rule authority
in matters of “local” concern. 48
For instance, in Colorado, the state’s constitution provides that
each city or town has the power to enact laws that extend “to all its local
and municipal matters,” and that such laws “shall supersede within the
territorial limits . . . any law of the state in conflict therewith.” 49
According to the Colorado Supreme Court, both state law and local law
can exist in areas of local concern, in areas of “mixed state and local
concern,” and in areas of statewide concern. 50 When local law and state
law are in conflict, local law prevails over conflicting state law in
45. Id.
46. Briffault, supra note 7, at 8; see also BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 9, at 327–28.
47. Briffault, supra note 7, at 8 (“[W]henever it is uncertain whether a locality possesses a
particular power, a court should assume that the locality lacks that power.”); BRIFFAULT &
REYNOLDS, supra note 9, at 327–28 (noting the same).
48. BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 9, at 330 (stating that thirty-seven states had
enacted constitutional or statutory home rule provisions by 1990 for at least some of their cities);
JON D. RUSSELL & AARON BOSTROM, AM. CITY CNTY. EXCH., FEDERALISM, DILLON RULE AND HOME
RULE (Jan. 2016), https://www.alec.org/app/uploads/2016/01/2016-ACCE-White-Paper-DillonHouse-Rule-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/SR5C-SGGG] (white paper publication of the American
City County Exchange showing which states follow Dillon’s Rule, which states provide local
governments with home rule authority, and arguing for limited local government authority
regardless of which rule is used).
49. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6; City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 573, 579
(Colo. 2016).
50. City of Longmont, 369 P.3d at 579. But see City of Northglenn v. Ibarra, 62 P.3d 151, 155
(Colo. 2003) (stating that in matters of statewide concern, home-rule cities may act only when
authorized by state constitution or statute).
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matters of “local” concern. However, state law prevails over local law if
the matter is one of statewide concern or of “mixed state and local
concern.” 51
Thus, in any case where both state and local law regulate the
same issue, a court must first determine whether the matter is one of
local, statewide, or mixed local and statewide concern. Once it does that,
if it determines the matter is one of solely local concern, it upholds the
local law. If, however, the court finds the matter is one of either mixed
local and statewide concern or solely of statewide concern, it must
determine whether state law expressly preempts local law by statute,
impliedly preempts local law by occupying the entire field of regulation,
or whether there is an “operational conflict” between state and local
law. 52
The Colorado Supreme Court conducted precisely this analysis
in 2016 in City of Longmont v. Colorado Oil & Gas Ass’n, a case in which
the Colorado Oil and Gas Association challenged the City of Longmont’s
ban on fracking operations within its borders. 53 The court first found
that fracking was a matter of mixed local and statewide concern
because of the state interest in uniform oil and gas regulation and the
local interest in regulating land use and zoning within municipal
borders. 54 The court then found no express or implied preemption of
local fracking authority in state law 55 but did find an operational
conflict between the local ban and state law based on the extensive
nature of state regulations governing the fracking process. Because the
local ban prevented oil and gas operators from using fracking
techniques that complied with state regulations, the local law
“materially impede[d] the effectuation of the state’s interests.” 56

51. City of Longmont, 369 P.3d at 579; see also Briffault, supra note 5, at 2011–13 (discussing
different judicial approaches to state preemption of local policy); Phillips, supra note 16, at 2233–
35 (discussing courts’ analyses of implied preemption in various states using different formulations
than that used in Colorado in the context of local living wage ordinances).
52. City of Longmont, 369 P.3d at 582.
53. Id. at 577.
54. Id. at 580.
55. Id. at 583–84. By contrast, Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, and New Mexico have all
enacted laws expressly preempting local governments from regulating oil and gas development
within their borders, and courts in those states upheld the states’ preemptive actions. See KLASS
& WISEMAN, supra note 12, at 75–77 (discussing cases); see also BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra
note 9, at 471–74 (discussing cases and legal scholarship on state preemption of local hydraulic
fracturing regulations).
56. City of Longmont, 369 P.3d at 585; see also City of Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n,
369 P.3d 586 (Colo. 2016) (striking down similar ban). Notably, in 2019, the Colorado legislature
enacted new legislation specifically giving local governments authority to regulate certain aspects
of hydraulic fracturing but leaving open the question of whether an outright ban would survive
legal challenge. KLASS & WISEMAN, supra note 12, at 76–77 (citing new legislation).
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This example shows that even in home rule states, local
governments remain vulnerable in their ability to regulate a wide range
of environmental, economic, and social policy matters. So long as the
issue in question has at least some statewide impact in addition to local
impact, a state can expressly preempt local law by eliminating local
authority over the matter, or a regulated entity can challenge local law
if either the state regulation is sufficiently comprehensive (implied
preemption) or there is an operational conflict between state and local
law. As shown below in Section B, state legislatures have frequently
used express preemption to eliminate local laws regulating fracking,
plastic waste, use of natural gas in buildings, living wages, fair
scheduling in employment, gun control, and LGBTQ discrimination,
among other areas. Based on over a century of case law, as explained
above, states are well within their state and federal constitutional
authority to take such actions, regardless of the policy implications.
B. Contemporary Preemption Battles
As of October 2021, Republicans controlled thirty state
legislatures (as compared to eighteen for Democrats), twenty-seven
governor seats (as compared to twenty-three for Democrats), and
twenty-three “trifectas”—control of both houses of the legislature as
well as the governor’s seat—(as compared to fifteen for Democrats). 57
At the same time, Democrats control most major U.S. cities, and have
increasingly enacted progressive economic, social, and environmental
protection measures such as minimum wage laws, fracking bans,
plastic bag bans, decarbonization goals and mandates, and protection
for LGBTQ residents. 58 This growing split between conservative state
57. State Partisan Composition, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 14, 2021),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/partisan-composition.aspx
[https://perma.cc/CN7A-B7DV]; 2021 State & Legislative Partisan Composition, NAT’L CONF. OF
STATE
LEGISLATURES
(May
1,
2021),
https://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/Elections/Legis_Control_5.2021.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U56M-BN2V]; see also Elaine S. Povich & Sophie Quinton, Republicans Fend Off
Democrats in Statehouse Fights, PEW CHARITABLE TRS.: STATELINE BLOG (Nov. 5, 2020),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2020/11/05/republicans-fendoff-democrats-in-statehouse-fights
[https://perma.cc/JF5F-XSUF]
(discussing
Republican
“trifectas” in Texas, Iowa, New Hampshire, and Montana).
58. See Derek Thompson, Why Big-City Dominance Is a Problem for Democrats, ATLANTIC
(Nov. 26, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/11/why-big-city-dominanceproblem-democrats/617161/ [https://perma.cc/BAY9-YGJ5] (discussing growing Democratic party
dominance in U.S. city governance and among urban residents, resulting in what the author terms
“Instagram socialists,” who are “highly educated, but not necessarily high-earning, urbanites who
shop like capitalists and post like Marxists and frequently do so in adjacent tabs”); see also
Davidson, supra note 5, at 965–68 (detailing range of local ordinances on economic, environmental
protection, and social issues preempted by state legislative actions); Briffault, supra note 5, at
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governments and progressive local governments has resulted in states
more aggressively limiting local authority over these often contentious
environmental, social, and economic policy issues. 59 In some cases, state
legislatures preempt local laws by replacing them with a uniform
statewide policy on the subject—like statewide regulations governing
hydraulic fracturing—while in other cases, state laws preempt local
laws by completely eliminating the ability of local governments to
legislate in the area in question or withholding funds from local
governments that attempt to enact such policies. 60
Nestor Davidson summarized this “sea change” of state laws
displacing local regulatory authority in a 2019 Yale Law Journal essay:
On civil rights, North Carolina preempted Charlotte’s authority to add LGBT
antidiscrimination protection to its local ordinances, leading to turmoil that brought
preemption conflicts to the national conversation. Arkansas and Tennessee have similarly
preempted local antidiscrimination laws, and so-called “bathroom bills” have become a
significant flashpoint in many states. Relatedly, on immigration, at least nine states now
have legislation limiting so-called sanctuary cities, with a wave of new legislation still
emerging.
Similar issues have arisen in other policy areas. In workplace regulation, at least twentyfive states preempt local minimum wage rules, at least nineteen states preempt local sickleave policies, and at least twelve states preempt local regulation of other types of
employee benefits. Similarly, with regard to public health, thirty-one states now preempt
in some form local regulation of tobacco products, and at least seven states preempt local
regulation of e-cigarettes or alternative tobacco products; at least twelve states preempt
local nutrition and food policies; and at least forty-four states preempt local authority
related to firearms. On local environmental protection, at least eight states preempt local
regulation of oil and gas drilling and conservation efforts, at least twelve states preempt

1999–2002 (same). But see Emily Badger, ‘Democrat Cities’ Aren’t as Partisan or as Powerful as
the
President
Suggests,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
2,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/02/upshot/trump-democratic-cities.html [https://perma.cc/597752TS] (discussing an increase in the number of Democratic mayors in big cities over time but citing
studies concluding that the partisanship of mayors has little impact on societal indicators such as
crime, social policy, and economic outcomes, because of the limited power of city government over
those issues); SCHRAGGER, supra note 1, at 102–03 (discussing inherent structural limits in city
and mayoral authority).
59. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 5, at 964 (discussing recent state preemption actions); see
also Lori Riverstone-Newell, The Rise of State Preemption Laws in Response to Local Policy
Innovation, 47 J. FEDERALISM 403, 405 (2017) (describing how recent state preemption laws differ
from prior ones); Worker Rights Preemption in the U.S., ECON. POL’Y INST.,
https://www.epi.org/preemption-map/ (last updated Aug. 2019) [https://perma.cc/GJB6-C6XY]
(detailing states with preemption laws that target key worker rights); DUPUIS ET AL., supra note
19, at 3–4 (showing state preemption of local worker rights provisions by state and stating that
“we are continuing to observe aggressive moves by state legislatures nationwide to usurp local
authority”).
60. See Briffault, supra note 5, at 1997 (“New preemption measures frequently displace local
action without replacing it with substantive state requirements. Often propelled by trade
association and business lobbying, many preemptive laws are aimed not at coordinating state and
local regulation but at preventing any regulation at all.”).
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localities from regulating or placing fees on plastic bags, and at least forty-two states
preempt local pesticide regulation. 61

On the environmental protection front, while the preemption
battles between state and local governments over fracking regulation 62
and plastic bags bans 63 dominated headlines in the early to mid-2010s,
2019 brought new conflicts over the continuing use of natural gas and
other fossil fuels in commercial and residential buildings. 64 Since 2019,
over fifty California cities including San Francisco, San Jose, and
Oakland, as well as New York City, have enacted local ordinances
restricting natural gas connections in new residential and commercial
construction to phase out the use of fossil fuels for heating and cooking
in favor of electricity—which is increasingly generated with carbon-free
energy in many parts of the country. 65
In 2020, Arizona, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Louisiana all
enacted what could be called “anticipatory preemption” laws,
61. Davidson, supra note 5, at 964–68 (footnotes omitted) (citing state legislation).
62. See supra notes 53–56 (discussing preemption litigation over local fracking regulations in
multiple states); see also Keith B. Hall, Oil and Gas Rights in Louisiana: Local Regulation of
Hydraulic Fracturing, LORMAN (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.lorman.com/resources/oil-and-gasrights-in-louisiana-local-regulation-of-hydraulic-fracturing-17352 [https://perma.cc/V569-BVFE]
(discussing state laws preempting local zoning and other regulations governing hydraulic
fracturing operations in Colorado, New York, Ohio, Louisiana, West Virginia, and Texas and court
decisions on the same).
63. See, e.g., State Plastic Bag Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Feb. 8,
2021),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/environment-and-natural-resources/plastic-baglegislation.aspx [https://perma.cc/FNS6-FMRL] (showing that as of 2021, eighteen states had
preempted local governments from regulating plastic packaging and bags in retail establishments,
with most of these laws enacted since 2015); Sarah Fox, Home Rule in an Era of Local
Environmental Innovation, 44 ECOLOGY L.Q. 575, 599–603, 616–23 (2017) (discussing preemption
battles over plastic bag bans). By contrast, at least eight states have placed their own bans on
plastic bags and certain plastic packaging consistent with the policies of numerous cities. See, e.g.,
Mike Catalini, NJ Governor Signs Bill to Ban Single-Use Plastic, Paper Bags, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Nov.
4,
2020),
https://apnews.com/article/environment-legislation-new-jersey973a1fe0018c35ca1c934dd6c9d11ca1 [https://perma.cc/VH8A-GD3R] (citing New Jersey and eight
other states with such bans).
64. See, e.g., Rebecca Leber, An “Attack on American Cities” Is Freezing Climate Action in its
Tracks, VOX (Sept. 29, 2021), https://www.vox.com/22691755/gas-utilities-fight-electrificationpreemption [https://perma.cc/FW52-2SKY]; Brad Plumer & Hiroko Tabuchi, How Politics Are
Determining
What
Stove
You
Use,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
16,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/16/climate/gas-stoves-climate-change.html
[https://perma.cc/ZA32-5YE3].
65. See Kristin Musulin, San Jose, Oakland, Join Growing List of California Cities to Ban
CITIES
DIVE
(Dec.
4,
2020),
Natural
Gas
Construction,
SMART
https://www.smartcitiesdive.com/news/san-jose-oakland-join-growing-list-of-california-cities-toban-natural-gas/591507/ [https://perma.cc/DS6U-VE3P]. In 2021, New York City became the
largest city in the country to ban natural gas connections in new buildings. Anne Barnard, N.Y.C.’s
Gas Ban Takes Fight Against Climate Change to the Kitchen, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/15/nyregion/nyc-gas-stove-heat-ban.html
[https://perma.cc/JT7T-TGN5]. The ban is predicted to have a significant impact on natural gas
policy given that New York City is responsible for five percent of nationwide natural gas use in
buildings. Id.
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prohibiting local governments from imposing similar bans on natural
gas use in new construction even though no local governments in those
states had imposed such bans. 66 In enacting such laws, these states sent
a message to local governments to avoid even engaging in a policy
debate on the issue in question to determine whether it would be in the
interests of local citizens because such a debate would be fruitless. 67 By
2021, the total number of states enacting such prohibitions on local
governments had risen to nineteen. 68
These recent actions by state legislatures to limit the power of
local governments to enact economic, environmental, and social policies
have led commentators to highlight the significant racial equity
concerns associated with these actions, particularly during the COVID19 pandemic. 69 This is because broad scale preemption generally serves
to shift regulatory power from local governments representing minority
communities to state governments more responsive to the desires and
politics of white citizens. 70
While state preemption of local ordinances regulating
environmental, public health, economic, and social issues is certainly
66. See, e.g., Jeffrey Tomich, Gas Ban Backlash Spreads Across the U.S., E&E NEWS (Feb. 2,
2021),
https://www.abralliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Gas-ban-backlash-spreadsacross-the-U.S.-EE-Energywire-2-2-21.pdf [https://perma.cc/RLU5-KUXP] (reporting on state
legislative actions to preempt local natural gas bans, even in states where none has been proposed,
and describing the level of activity as “expos[ing] a more localized power struggle between state
and city governments”); Jeff Brady & Dan Charles, As Cities Grapple with Climate Change, Gas
Utilities
Fight
to
Stay
in
Business,
NPR
(Feb.
22,
2021,
4:19
PM),
https://www.npr.org/2021/02/22/967439914/as-cities-grapple-with-climate-change-gas-utilitiesfight-to-stay-in-business [https://perma.cc/QH5E-9FH3] (discussing industry and legislative
efforts to preempt local natural gas bans).
67. See Phillips, supra note 16, at 2244–45 (discussing similar “anticipatory” preemption laws
in Ohio and Arizona, which both enacted laws prohibiting local governments from enacting worker
rights policies (a living wage in Ohio and fair scheduling in Arizona) before a single city in either
state had enacted such a law); see also Briffault, supra note 5, at 2009–11 (discussing potential
First Amendment implications when states act to stifle local government debate or voting).
68. Tom DiChristopher, Gas Ban Monitor: Building Electrification Evolves as 19 States
Prohibit Bans, S&P GLOB. (July 20, 2021), https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/newsinsights/latest-news-headlines/gas-ban-monitor-building-electrification-evolves-as-19-statesprohibit-bans-65518738 [https://perma.cc/8DEE-5XZG].
69. See supra notes 16–18, 27, and accompanying text (discussing racial equity concerns
associated with recent state preemption efforts, including with regard to COVID-19). For example,
a proposed bill in Texas in 2021, S. 14, would eliminate local governments’ ability to mandate paid
sick leave. S. 14, 87th Leg., 2d Called Sess. (Tex. 2021). In addition, the bill would prohibit local
governments from requiring construction workers be given periodic water breaks. Id.; Ariel
Wittenberg, ‘People Can Die’: Texas Bill Would Strip Worker Water Breaks, E&E NEWS (Aug. 17,
2021),
https://www.eenews.net/articles/people-can-die-texas-bill-would-strip-worker-waterbreaks/ [https://perma.cc/U9JR-6768]. The bill is viewed as a Republican-led attempt to retaliate
against progressive cities like Austin and Dallas, which enacted ordinances to protect workers
during the pandemic. Wittenberg, supra.
70. See supra notes 16–18, 27, and accompanying text (discussing political implications of
state preemption of local government authority for racial minorities).
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not a new phenomenon, state laws preempting local policy initiatives
have become increasingly combative and punitive in recent years. 71 For
instance, in the area of gun regulation, several states have enacted laws
that impose significant fines, civil and criminal liability, and removal
from office for local officials who enact or enforce gun control measures
inconsistent with state laws preempting such local regulations. 72 Laws
in Kentucky and Florida also include private rights of action for
damages by individuals and organizations against local officials for
violating the letter or “spirit” of the state gun preemption law. 73 More
broadly, in 2016, Arizona enacted SB 1487, which eliminated state aid
to local governments with preempted laws on their books. 74 Under SB
1487, a state legislator may request that the attorney general
investigate and report on claims that local governments have violated
the law. 75 If the attorney general finds that a local law “may” be
preempted, the attorney general must bring an immediate action in the
state supreme court and, in order to respond to the action, the local
government in question must post a bond “equal to the amount of
shared revenue” it received over the past six months. 76 The state
treasurer shall withhold local government funds until the violation is
resolved. 77 The law has resulted in multiple investigations of local
government laws, including ones related to gun control, plastic bag
bans, and truck regulations. 78
Finally, legislatures in Oklahoma, Texas, and Florida have
considered what Richard Briffault terms “nuclear preemption”—
eliminating entirely the ability of local governments to exercise
legislative power in any area where state law exists rather than
selectively preempting that authority in particular subject areas such
as gun control, hydraulic fracturing, or setting a minimum wage. 79
71. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 5, at 1997 (describing the “new preemption” as “sweeping
state laws that clearly, intentionally, extensively, and at times punitively bar local efforts to
address a host of problems”).
72. Id. at 2002–07; Phillips, supra note 16, at 2247–51.
73. Briffault, supra note 5, at 2002–04; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 65.870(2)-(3), (6), 522.020.030 (West 2021).
74. Briffault, supra note 5, at 2005–06; Act of Mar. 17, 2016, ch. 35, 2016 Ariz. Sess. Laws
161 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the Arizona Revised Statutes); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 41-194.01 (2021).
75. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-194.01(A).
76. Id. § 41-194.01(B)(2).
77. Id.
78. See SB 1487 Investigations, ARIZ. ATT’Y GEN., https://www.azag.gov/complaints/sb1487investigations (last visited Oct. 2, 2021) [https://perma.cc/QA7D-JJ8E]; Briffault, supra note 5, at
2004–07 (discussing Arizona law).
79. See Briffault, supra note 5, at 2007–08; see also Erin Adele Scharff, Hyper Preemption: A
Reordering of the State-Local Relationship, 106 GEO. L.J. 1469, 1502–04 (2018) (discussing same
phenomenon as “blanket preemption”).
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While no state has yet enacted such a law, corporations and other
interest groups will undoubtedly continue to push for elimination of
local government power over land use, business practices, and worker
rights. With the continued deep political divide between cities and
states, such laws may find a growing receptive audience in state
legislatures.
C. A Way Out? Local Governments as “Proprietors”
State and local government scholars generally articulate three
distinct roles for local governments in the U.S. constitutional
framework. 80 The first treats local governments solely as
instrumentalities of the state—the state can grant local governments
power but can also eliminate that power if it chooses. This approach is
reflected in both Dillon’s Rule and Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 81
discussed in Part I.A. The second approach considers local governments
as autonomous actors based on their history and practice as selfgoverning entities. This approach embraces a greater commitment to
localism and is reflected in court decisions upholding local voting rights
or otherwise upholding local action in the face of state opposition. 82 The
third approach, discussed in this Section, is where the local government
acts in a “proprietary” capacity like a private corporation. In this role,
“[l]ocal constituents are seen more as consumers or investors than as
members of a democratic community, and local services are treated as
relatively private—providing distinct benefits to particular local
taxpaying constituents—rather than broadly public.” 83 Although local
governments can act in a proprietary capacity in a number of situations,
including business improvement districts, water districts, and
sanitation districts, they can also do so when acting as a municipal
electric utility. 84
80. See, e.g., BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 9, at 73–75.
81. 207 U.S. 161, 179 (1907).
82. BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 9, at 73–75; see also Hannah J. Wiseman, Rethinking
Municipal Corporate Rights, 61 B.C. L. REV. 591, 598 (2020) (contending that “municipalities’
important status as corporations that provide essential public services—particularly to people who
otherwise would struggle to obtain those services—and project their citizens’ views on an
increasingly national and international platform needs explicit recognition,” and that this “status
should factor prominently in the balancing tests that courts often deploy when deciding intrastate
preemption questions”).
83. BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 9, at 74.
84. See generally Hugh D. Spitzer, Realigning the Governmental/Proprietary Distinction in
Municipal Law, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 173 (2016) (discussing seven areas of law where proprietary
powers have been distinguished from governmental powers and arguing for a reassessment of this
distinction). The provision of broadband internet service, an exercise of local government
proprietary powers, has emerged in recent years as another flashpoint in state and local
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Since as early as Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh in 1907, courts
have treated local governments quite differently when acting in their
proprietary capacity than when acting in their regulatory capacity. In
Hunter, the Court qualified its declaration of local government
subservience to the state by noting that “in describing the absolute
power of the state over the property of municipal corporations, we have
not extended it beyond the property held and used for governmental
purposes.” 85 Instead, according to the Court, when local governments
act in their private capacity, “the legislature is not omnipotent.” 86
Courts have overwhelmingly embraced this deference to local
governments acting in their proprietary capacity as municipal electric
utilities. For instance, in City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 87 the
Washington Supreme Court in 1987 upheld the ability of the Tacoma
municipal utility to pay for the installation of energy conservation
devices in homes when residents challenged such payments as an
unconstitutional gift of public funds. 88 In affirming the city’s power to
invest in the conservation program, it first cited Dillon’s Rule, and
found that the city had discretion in how it carried out its operations as
a municipal utility because the state had expressly granted cities the
power to form and operate municipal utilities. 89 It then discussed the
importance of the regulatory/proprietary distinction with regard to local
power:
Like other state supreme courts, we have historically taken different approaches to
construing municipal powers according to whether the power exercised is governmental
or proprietary in nature. When a governmental function is involved, less opportunity
exists for invoking the doctrines of liberal construction and of implied powers. But when
the Legislature authorizes a municipality to engage in a business, “ ‘[it] may exercise its
business powers very much in the same way as a private individual . . . .’ ” Actions taken
pursuant to [the municipal utility statute] serve a business, proprietary function, rather
than a governmental function. 90

government relations. See Jon Reid, Municipal Broadband War Reignited in Biden’s Infrastructure
Push, BLOOMBERG L. (Apr. 1, 2021, 4:00 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/tech-and-telecomlaw/municipal-broadband-war-reignited-in-bidens-infrastructure-push
[https://perma.cc/S9PDLE9P]. While there are over 140 citywide municipal broadband networks, and many more
municipal networks with partial coverage, nineteen states place limitations on the ability of local
governments to provide broadband service. Id.
85. Hunter, 207 U.S. at 179.
86. Id.; see also Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1111
(1980) (noting fifty years of court decisions distinguishing “the city’s governmental functions,
which were subject to absolute state power, from its proprietary functions, which received the
constitutional protection afforded to rights of private property”).
87. 743 P.2d 793 (Wash. 1987).
88. Id. at 794.
89. Id. at 799–800.
90. Id. at 800–01 (citations omitted).
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Thus, when it comes to municipal utilities, even a state that applies
Dillon’s Rule does not impose a strict rule of construction on local
government authority when the local government is acting in its role as
a municipal utility.
Finally, courts have held that municipal utilities have even more
power than private companies when acting in their proprietary
capacity—most notably the power to avoid state regulation of their
prices, services, and actions. For instance, in 1921, in Springfield Gas
& Electric Co. v. City of Springfield, 91 a private electric utility sought to
prevent the City of Springfield—a municipal utility in Illinois—from
selling electricity to private consumers without first filing and posting
rate schedules with the state public utility commission, as was required
for all private electric utilities in the state. 92 The state statute in
question subjected private utilities to extensive state public utility
commission regulation of rates, charges, and services but expressly
exempted municipal utilities from those regulations. 93
In rejecting the company’s argument that the distinction
between private utilities and municipal utilities with regard to state
regulation violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution,
Justice Holmes explained why such a distinction was justified. He
stated that:
The private corporation[,] whatever its public duties[,] is organized for private ends and
may be presumed to intend to make whatever profit the business will allow. The
municipal corporation is allowed to go into the business only on the theory that thereby
the public welfare will be subserved. So far as gain is an object it is a gain to a public body
and must be used for public ends. Those who manage the work cannot lawfully make
private profit their aim, as the plaintiff’s directors not only may but must. 94

Accordingly, Hunter stands for the proposition that local governments
possess enhanced power and autonomy when acting in a proprietary
capacity and Springfield Gas & Electric Co. holds that when they do so,
they are acting in the public interest, providing a separate justification
for their freedom from state control.
D. State Laws and Constitutions Governing Municipalization
Today, every state except Hawaii explicitly authorizes the
creation of a municipal electric utility. The vast majority provide the

91.
92.
93.
94.

257 U.S. 66 (1921).
Id. at 68–69.
Id.
Id. at 70.
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authority to do so by statute, 95 while six states grant such authority in
their state constitutions. 96 A few home rule states devolve this
authority to the local level and allow creation of a municipal utility only
when the municipality’s charter itself reflects the right to do so. 97 The
ability to operate a utility outside the territorial limits of the
municipality, if authorized at all, is usually more circumscribed. 98
While there is state-to-state variation in the precise steps
required to establish a municipal electric utility, most contemporary
municipalization efforts follow a similar pattern. Interest in
municipalization normally arises as the expiration of the municipality’s
franchise agreement with its investor-owned utility approaches. 99 As
discussed in Part II.B, the basic form of the franchise agreement grants
an investor-owned utility the exclusive right to operate in the
community and to use the city’s rights-of-way in exchange for a
franchise fee. 100 Modern franchise agreements often include other
concessions from the investor-owned utility, for example, regarding
postconstruction cleanup or locating electric infrastructure
underground. 101

95. Thirty-nine states grant local governments the power to municipalize by statute. See
Abby Briggerman, Radu Costinescu & Ashley Bond, Survey of State Municipalization Laws, AM.
PUB.
POWER
ASS’N
(May
2012),
https://www.publicpower.org/system/files/documents/muncipalization-survey_of_state_laws.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J5RY-JYXB] (citing statutes from Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming).
96. Id. (citing constitutions of California, Colorado, Florida, Michigan, Ohio, and South
Carolina).
97. Id. (citing statutes from Delaware, Maryland, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Texas).
98. Several states allow municipal utilities to furnish service outside their corporate
boundaries with conditions. Briggerman et al., supra note 95 (citing statutes from California,
Colorado, Indiana, Kansas, Montana, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Utah, and Wyoming).
99. Hawaii, Maine, Montana, North Carolina, and Wisconsin prohibit cities from negotiating
their own franchise agreements. Jeffrey J. Cook, Bryn Ursula Grunwald, Alison Holm & Alexandra
Aznar, Wait, Cities Can Do What? Achieving City Energy Goals Through Franchise Agreements,
144 ENERGY POL’Y, Sept. 2020, at 5. Investor-owned utilities and their regulation are discussed in
detail in Part II.A.
100. AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, Public Power for Your Community, supra note 30, at 14. In
practice, the investor-owned utility routinely passes on to consumers the costs of the franchise fee
instead of bearing them as legitimate business expenses. Id.
101. But see Paul Hughes, Renegotiating a Municipal Franchise During Electricity
Restructuring
and
Deregulation,
A M.
PUB.
POWER
ASS’N
(July
2002),
http://www.informedcynic.com/SEC/buyout-docs/Renegotiating%20a%20Franchise.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S9LN-HM7T] (stating most municipalities do not maximize the regulatory
potential of the franchise agreement and proposing several strategic negotiation goals).
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With terms of ten, twenty, or even up to fifty years, 102 the
expiration of the franchise agreement is a significant opportunity for a
municipality to reassess its relationship with its investor-owned utility.
Whether or not a city ultimately elects to municipalize, the threatened
loss of franchise rights gives it leverage to request a host of beneficial
stipulations: to achieve cost savings, to improve reliability, to invest in
the community, or to incorporate substantive policy goals. 103 A
favorable new agreement is often sufficient to dissuade most
communities from pursuing municipalization. 104
For communities that are not satisfied with the potential terms
the investor-owned utility has offered in the new franchise agreement,
the local government will generally commission an outside firm to
conduct a feasibility study to assess the costs and benefits of leaving the
investor-owned utility and establishing a municipal electric utility. 105
Feasibility studies consider both the economic viability of the project as
102. An example of a fifty-year franchise agreement is the one governing electricity delivery
in San Diego, which signed its prior franchise agreement with San Diego Gas & Electric in 1970.
Rob Nikolewski, San Diego Renegotiating Utility Franchise Agreement for the First Time in 50
DIEGO
UNION
TRIB.
(Oct.
11,
2019,
6:00
AM),
Years,
SAN
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/business/energy-green/story/2019-10-11/franchiseagreement [https://perma.cc/4Z9C-DZFT].
103. See Cook et al., supra note 99, at 2 (discussing potential to achieve renewable energy
objectives through commitments in franchise agreements).
104. AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, Public Power for Your Community, supra note 30, at 31.
105. See, e.g., R. W. BECK, INC., PRELIMINARY MUNICIPALIZATION FEASIBILITY STUDY: CITY OF
BOULDER,
COLORADO
(Oct.
2005),
https://wwwstatic.bouldercolorado.gov/docs/energy_future_2005_Preliminary_feasibility_study_from_RWBec
k-1-201306061215.pdf [https://perma.cc/T38C-KW37]; MIKE BULL ET AL., CTR. FOR ENERGY &
ENV’T, MINNEAPOLIS ENERGY PATHWAYS: A FRAMEWORK FOR LOCAL ENERGY ACTION (Feb. 2014),
https://d36iur3orme9ke.cloudfront.net/wpcontent/uploads/2019/01/www.ci_.minneapolis.mn_.us_www_groups_public_@citycoordinator_doc
uments_webcontent_wcms1p-121587.pdf [https://perma.cc/DDT9-MW5U]; CONCENTRIC ENERGY
ADVISORS, PRELIMINARY FEASIBILITY STUDY: CITY OF PUEBLO, COLORADO MUNICIPALIZATION
(Sept. 2019), https://ceadvisors.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Pueblo-Feasibility-Study.pdf
[https://perma.cc/22Q2-D4AV]; CONCENTRIC ENERGY ADVISORS, PRELIMINARY FEASIBILITY STUDY:
CITY OF PITTSBURG, KANSAS MUNICIPALIZATION (July 2019), https://www.evergy.com//media/documents/community/concentric-preliminary-feasibility-study-pittsburgmunicipalization-july-2019.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/L48W-NAXE]; THOMAS VITOLO ET AL.,
SYNAPSE ENERGY ECON., INC., AN ANALYSIS OF MUNICIPALIZATION AND RELATED UTILITY
PRACTICES
(Sept.
2017),
https://doee.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ddoe/publication/attachments/An%20Analysis%20of
%20Municipalization%20and%20Related%20Utility%20Practices.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SBP8GYVC]; S.F. WATER POWER SEWER, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON ELECTRIC SERVICE OPTIONS (May
2019),
https://sfpuc.org/sites/default/files/about-us/policiesreports/PreliminaryReportElectricServiceOptions_13may2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5PWM7DSY]; OFF. OF THE N.Y.C. PUB. ADVOC., supra note 6 (municipalization feasibility study for New
York City); NEWGEN STRATEGIES & SOLS., PRELIMINARY MUNICIPAL UTILITY FEASIBILITY STUDY:
CITY
OF
CHICAGO,
ILLINOIS
(Aug.
2020),
https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/dgs/supp_info/City_of_Chicago_20200828_Prelim
inary_Municipal_Utility_Feasibility_Study.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5D6-36NL].
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well as the likelihood that creating a municipal utility will achieve the
local government’s specific objectives. 106 If the feasibility study
determines municipalization is possible, practical, and desirable, the
city holds a referendum to proceed with municipalization. 107 Once these
initial hurdles are cleared, the negotiations then begin with the
incumbent investor-owned utility to purchase the existing assets and
distribution infrastructure serving the locale. 108 Local governments
usually face fierce resistance in these negotiations; 109 consequently,
many states authorize the exercise of eminent domain authority to
acquire the necessary distribution facilities from the incumbent
investor-owned utility. 110 In some cases, an independent state agency
may play a role in approving the final price paid by the municipality,
particularly if it is difficult to separate investor-owned utility assets
used to serve the local government from assets used to serve other
nearby communities. 111 All told, municipalization usually involves
several years of sustained community effort; depending on the
106. See infra Part II.B for a discussion of common goals and policies.
107. Statutory requirements delineate the subject of the referendum. It may concern the
general prospect of proceeding with municipalization, or it may more specifically authorize the
purchase or condemnation of investor-owned utility infrastructure. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9-514 (2021) (election for “authority to engage in utility business”); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 360(5)
(McKinney 2021) (referendum for construction of new facilities or acquisition of investor-owned
utility facilities); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2109(B) (2021) (referendum for acquiring investor-owned
utility facilities); WIS. STAT. § 197.01(1) (2021) (voter approval for purchasing investor-owned
utility facilities).
108. Although a municipality technically may bypass the incumbent altogether and build its
own new facilities, the inefficiencies created by duplicating distribution infrastructure make this
method of municipalization rare in practice. See Suedeen Kelly, Municipalization of Electricity:
The Allure of Lower Rates for Bright Lights in Big Cities, 37 NAT. RES. J. 43, 44 (1997) (discussing
options for municipal ownership and control of distribution facilities). “Muni-lite” briefly presented
a third pathway to municipalization boldly attempted by several cities in the 1990s. Id. at 44–45.
“Muni-lite” consisted of a municipality merely installing its own meter at the end of the
incumbent’s distribution line in each house and business. Id. The Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (“FERC”) soundly rejected this approach as insufficient ownership or control of
distribution facilities; i.e., “muni-lite” constituted a “sham” attempt to create a municipal utility.
See Michael J. Doane & Daniel F. Spulber, Municipalization: Opportunism and Bypass in Electric
Power, 18 ENERGY L.J. 333, 338–41 (1997).
109. See infra Part II.B.
110. See Briggerman et al., supra note 95 (citing eminent domain authority in Alabama,
Alaska, California, Colorado, and Florida, among others).
111. S.F. WATER POWER SEWER, supra note 105, at 45; see, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-811
(2021) (requiring a court-appointed commission to appraise facilities and subsequent approval by
the court); MINN. STAT. § 216B.45 (2021) (state agency determines compensation for facilities when
municipality and investor-owned utility cannot agree on a price); see also Application of the City
of Boulder, Colorado for Approval of the Proposed Transfer of Assets From Public Service Company
of Colorado to the City, Proceeding No. 15A-0589E, Decision No. C17-0750, Colo. Pub. Utils.
Comm’n (Sept. 14, 2017), at ¶¶ 97, 149 (discussing need for state agency to provide oversight on
separation and valuation because the “highly integrated” nature of Boulder’s grid system meant
Xcel would need to use “significant facilities” within the city post-separation to serve nearby
communities); infra Part II.B (discussing Boulder’s municipalization effort).
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onerousness of the procedural requirements and the litigiousness of the
incumbent, it can take upwards of a decade. 112
Once formed, municipal utilities are significantly freer from
state and federal regulation of rates, charges, and services than
investor-owned utilities. 113 As discussed in Part II.A., the Federal
Power Act explicitly exempts municipal and other governmental
utilities from Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”)
regulation and most states similarly exclude municipal utilities from
state regulation. 114 Instead, municipal utility retail rates and charges
are determined by the utility leadership itself, which usually takes the
form of either a democratically elected city council or a commission
appointed by local elected officials. 115 This exemption from state
regulatory oversight relieves municipal utilities of a substantial
regulatory burden. State regulation of investor-owned utilities extends
far beyond rate-setting to encompass approval of, for example, the

112. Because of the significant burdens associated with breaking away from an existing
investor-owned utility, legislatures in ten states—all of which are restructured and no longer have
vertically integrated utilities—have enacted so-called Community Choice Aggregation (“CCA”)
laws to give local governments more authority over power resources short of full municipalization.
CCA by State, LOC. ENERGY AGGREGATION NETWORK U.S., https://www.leanenergyus.org/cca-bystate (last visited Oct. 2, 2021) [https://perma.cc/XP9T-E9FW]; ERIC O’SHAUGHNESSY, JENNY
HEETER, JULIEN GATTACIECCA, JENNY SAUER, KELLY TRUMBULL & EMILY CHEN, NAT’L
RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB’Y, COMMUNITY CHOICE AGGREGATION: CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES,
IMPACTS
ON
RENEWABLE
ENERGY
MARKETS
(Feb.
2019),
AND
https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy19osti/72195.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9LM-DL58].
CCA laws allow a group of local governments to purchase their electricity from a preferred
provider while relying on their existing utility for transmission and distribution. Community
Choice Aggregation Policies, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 12, 2015),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/community-choice-aggregation.aspx
[https://perma.cc/CCZ3-GT2K]. CCA laws thus allow local governments to exercise control similar
to municipalization while avoiding the litigation and expense associated with acquiring an
incumbent investor-owned utility’s infrastructure. See generally Welton, supra note 34, at 310;
JOHN FARRELL, INST. FOR LOC. SELF-RELIANCE, COMMUNITY CHOICE ENERGY 3 (Feb. 2020),
https://ilsr.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/CommunityChoiceEnergyReportILSR.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5ZQ5-392C].
113. Under the Federal Power Act, FERC regulates wholesale electricity sales in interstate
commerce and interstate transmission, while state commissions have jurisdiction over retail
electric sales. See Federal Power Act § 201, 16 U.S.C. § 824; infra Part II.A.
114. See infra Part II.A. Only six states authorize full rate regulation of municipal utilities by
the state’s public utility commission—Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Rhode Island, Vermont, and
Wisconsin. Authority of State Commissions to Regulate Rates of Public Power Utilities, AM. PUB.
POWER
ASS’N
(June
2014),
https://www.publicpower.org/system/files/documents/Rate%20Regulation%20of%20PP%20chart%
20412.pdf [https://perma.cc/WSS6-HDDA]. Additionally, public utility commission rate oversight
exists in several states where a municipal utility operates outside its territorial limits or under
other specific circumstances. Id.
115. What is Public Power, AM. MUN. POWER, https://www.amppartners.org/consumers/whatis-public-power (last visited Dec. 21, 2021) [https://perma.cc/6W4N-X3HL].
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utility’s power supply, 116 energy efficiency and conservation
measures, 117 and even the ability to disconnect delinquent customers. 118
To the extent municipal utilities are not beholden to a state regulator
for permission to undertake similar measures, they have greater
flexibility to experiment with and implement innovative policies. 119
E. Municipal Utilities in the Courts
Local government authority is almost impervious to outside
attack once a municipal utility is formed. In its unique proprietary role,
municipal utilities can expand their territory, 120 condemn property, 121
compete with other electricity providers, 122 and delegate their
authority, 123 among other actions. Litigation between municipal
116. At least thirty states have enacted renewable portfolio standards, which require investorowned utilities to source a certain percentage of their electricity from renewable or carbon-free
resources. Renewable & Clean Energy Standards, N.C. CLEAN ENERGY TECH. CTR. (Sept. 2020),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/ncsolarcen-prod/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/RPS-CES-Sept2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/88KE-MX79]. A similar number of states mandate that utilities submit to the
public utilities commission an integrated resource plan detailing their load forecast, resource
additions and retirements, and performance assumptions over the next ten to twenty years. See,
e.g., Coley Girouard, Understanding IRPs: How Utilities Plan for the Future, ADVANCED ENERGY
ECON.:
ADVANCED
ENERGY
PERSPS.
BLOG
(Aug.
11,
2015,
4:59
PM),
https://blog.aee.net/understanding-irps-how-utilities-plan-for-the-future [https://perma.cc//43DPNA6R].
117. See, e.g., Energy Efficiency Resource Standards, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT
ECON., https://database.aceee.org/state/energy-efficiency-resource-standards (last visited Dec. 21,
2021) [https://perma.cc/CV6X-MSYB] (listing energy efficiency portfolio standards imposed by
state public utility commissions on investor-owned utilities); Megan Cleveland, Logan Dunning &
Jesse Heibel, State Policies for Utility Investment in Energy Efficiency, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES
(Apr.
2019),
https://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/energy/Utility_Incentives_4_2019_33375.pdf?ver=2019
-04-04-154310-703 [https://perma.cc/7P26-R2L5] (discussing public utility commission
mechanisms to incentivize energy efficiency including decoupling, lost revenue adjustment
mechanisms, and shared net benefits, among others).
118. During the COVID-19 pandemic, more than thirty-six states imposed on investor-owned
utilities some form of prohibition against disconnections for nonpaying customers. Map of
ASS’N
OF
REGUL.
UTIL.
COMM’RS,
Disconnection
Moratoria,
NAT’L
https://www.naruc.org/compilation-of-covid-19-news-resources/map-of-disconnection-moratoria/
(last updated Sept. 9, 2021) [https://perma.cc/8WJN-ZAU9].
119. Outka, supra note 36, at 128–29 (citing discussion of Osage, Iowa, energy efficiency
improvements in RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND
RESTRUCTURING IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM 157–58 (1999)).
120. See infra notes 129–137 and accompanying text (discussing Tri-County Elec. Ass’n, Inc.
v. City of Gillette, 584 P.2d 995 (Wyo. 1978)).
121. See infra notes 124–128 and accompanying text (discussing In re Petition of the Town of
Springfield to Condemn Certain Distrib. & Transmission Facilities of Cent. Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp.
in Springfield, 469 A.2d 375 (Vt. 1983)).
122. See infra note 137 (discussing Poudre Valley Rural Elec. Ass’n v. City of Loveland, 807
P.2d 547 (Colo. 1991)).
123. See infra notes 139–142 and accompanying text (discussing Frank v. City of Cody, 572
P.2d 1106 (Wyo. 1977)).
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utilities and other power providers illustrates the wide range of
autonomous actions municipal utilities may take without state
interference.
The right to create a municipal utility itself underscores the
independence of local governments in this area from the outset. For
instance, in 1982, Vermont’s Public Service Board (“PSB”) denied the
Town of Springfield’s petition to condemn the property of its incumbent
electricity provider, submitted after the duly required referendum,
based on the PSB’s authority to alter and establish utility service
territories. 124 The PSB reasoned this authority allowed it to determine
whether Springfield’s electric utility would be “consistent with the
general good of Vermont.” 125 In Petition of the Town of Springfield, the
Vermont Supreme Court reversed, holding that where a municipality
complied with the statutory notice and referendum requirements, the
PSB’s jurisdiction did not extend to “the unfettered right accorded [to]
municipalities” to establish an electric utility. 126 The court emphasized
the “determination of the town voters to establish such a utility [is not
subject] to any board overview whatsoever.” 127 Furthermore, the PSB
had no role in reviewing Springfield’s condemnation of incumbent
property lying within the town borders. 128
The boundaries of a municipality are not static, of course, and a
municipal electric utility has the right to expand along with the
population it serves. A case from Wyoming, Tri-County Electric Ass’n,
Inc. v. City of Gillette, illustrates the perils for any electricity provider
operating adjacent to a municipal utility. 129 The City of Gillette and TriCounty—a rural electric cooperative serving the surrounding area—
entered into an agreement in 1960 defining their respective
territories. 130 The Wyoming Public Service Commission (“PSC”)
approved the contract at the time, but a year later the Wyoming
legislature removed from PSC jurisdiction any authority over municipal
utility operations within their corporate limits. 131 Gillette subsequently
underwent “phenomenal growth” and embarked on a series of
territorial annexations to accommodate its new population. During
these annexations, the city issued an ordinance requiring a franchise
agreement prior to any construction of new electrical facilities or service
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Town of Springfield, 469 A.2d at 375 n.1, 376.
Id. at 376.
Id. at 378.
Id.
Id. at 380.
584 P.2d 995 (Wyo. 1978).
Id. at 998.
Id.
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to new customers. 132 In 1970, Tri-County requested permission to build
a transmission line to serve territory allocated to it in the 1960
agreement; failing to obtain Gillette’s consent, Tri-County nonetheless
proceeded with construction and service. 133
In resolving Tri-County’s assertion of a right to serve the area in
question, the Wyoming Supreme Court found that any territorial rights
from the 1960 agreement only arose through the approval of the PSC. 134
Since the PSC had no jurisdiction over municipal electric utility
operations within the bounds of the municipality after 1961, any
exclusive territorial right held by Tri-County was extinguished with
Gillette’s lawful expansion into the disputed area. 135 The court observed
that it was the nature of cities to expand and, thus, “anyone claiming
electric utility rights pertaining only to rural territory entering areas
contiguous to a city does so with notice that the municipality will very
likely expand and is subject to that event.” 136 Accordingly, in states
where municipal utilities have an absolute right to operate within
municipal boundaries, they also hold a virtually absolute right to accrue
new territory and new customers. 137 In taking these actions, the
municipal utility’s decisions are generally “immune” from state
regulation. 138
Due to their “proprietary” nature, municipal utilities also have
the right to delegate authority in ways that would be illegal if the
municipal government was acting in a regulatory capacity. In Frank v.
City of Cody, the mayor of Cody, Wyoming, attempted to block the city’s
participation in the formation and financing of a joint power agency
with the municipal utilities of nearby small towns for the construction
132. Id. at 999.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1004 (“The contract created no territorial rights; whatever territorial rights came
into being were created by the Certificate of Convenience and Necessity issued by the P.S.C.”).
135. Id. at 1005:
The legislature has bestowed power on a city or town to operate an electric utility within
its corporate limits, as expanded from time to time. The P.S.C. has had taken from it
any power to function within the boundaries of a city in carrying out its assignment of
utility regulation in granting territorial rights for utility service.
136. Id. at 1006.
137. Id.; see also Poudre Valley Rural Elec. Ass’n v. City of Loveland, 807 P.2d 547, 551–53,
556–58 (Colo. 1991) (municipal utility has power to selectively choose which areas of adjacent
territory to annex and which facilities to condemn despite protests of neighboring, competing rural
electric cooperative).
138. See, e.g., City of Colo. Springs v. Mountain View Elec. Ass’n, 925 P.2d 1378, 1383 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1995) (“[T]he City is immune from [state] regulation of its ownership or operation of an
electric utility.”); see also id. at 1382 (“The rationale for this rule is that, inasmuch as persons
dissatisfied with the utility’s service may use the municipal elections to express their discontent,
there is no one who requires protection by the [state regulators] when the utility is owned by a
municipality.”).
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of new power plants. 139 The Mayor protested the venture as an
unconstitutional delegation of municipal authority—first, because the
agency would control Cody’s electric supply and, second, because a
private company would manage the construction and operation of the
new facilities. 140
In 1977, the Wyoming Supreme Court rejected both contentions,
observing that only delegations of municipal functions were
unconstitutional; the “business of selling electricity to its inhabitants”
is a proprietary function. 141 The involvement of a private company made
no difference: “[a]s long as the municipality and its representatives
retain their powers of judgment, discretion and management, there is
no objection to an alliance with private enterprise, with the latter
performing ministerial and executive functions requiring special
skills.” 142
These cases show the durable and expansive scope of local power
when the local government is acting in its proprietary capacity as a
municipal utility. In some states, this is due to the constitutional nature
of local government authority. In others, it may be attributable to the
bipartisan nature of municipal electric utilities—existing for over a
century in both conservative and progressive, as well as urban and
rural, communities. This durability lays the groundwork for local
governments today to use either their existing status as a municipal
utility—or simply the power to municipalize when negotiating with the
investor-owned utility currently serving the city—to achieve a variety
of economic, social, and environmental protection goals. These current
efforts are discussed in Part II, which describes in more detail precisely
how local governments have used this enhanced power to create and
operate municipal electric utilities in the interests of their citizens to
promote a wide range of policy goals. As shown below, these policy goals
have shifted over time in response to developments in economics,
technology, climate science, public opinion, and social and racial equity.
II. LOCAL POWER II: LOCAL AUTHORITY OVER POWER SYSTEMS
Today there are over two thousand large and small municipal
utilities throughout the country, including Los Angeles, California;
Austin, Texas; Cleveland, Ohio; and many others. 143 Part II begins with
a brief discussion of the electricity sector before detailing historic and
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Frank v. City of Cody, 572 P.2d 1106, 1107–08 (Wyo. 1977).
Id. at 1108–11.
Id. at 1110.
Id. at 1111.
AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, Public Power for Your Community, supra note 30, at 7.
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contemporary municipalization efforts. It explores the history of local
actions to take control of the delivery of electricity to citizens and the
range of economic, environmental, and political rationales underlying
local power campaigns. This Part also illustrates how the goals of
municipalization have evolved over time to include environmental
protection, climate change, energy democracy, and racial and economic
equity.
A. Electricity 101
In the United States, public and private “electric utilities” sell
electric energy from over ten thousand large fossil fuel, nuclear, and
renewable energy power plants (primarily wind and solar) to other
electric utilities (wholesale sales) and end-use residential, commercial,
and industrial customers (retail sales), through a vast network of longdistance electric transmission and distribution lines. 144 These largescale power plants are in addition to the growing number of smaller
scale “distributed energy resources” such as rooftop solar panels,
community solar gardens, small-scale geothermal plants, and the like
that also provide electric energy resources to a growing number of
power providers and consumers. 145 Although the share of total
electricity derived from fossil fuels has decreased significantly in the
last decade, it remains a substantial share of total U.S. electricity
generation. 146 In 2020, fossil fuel plants—powered almost exclusively
by coal and natural gas—constituted approximately 60% of total U.S.
electricity generation; nuclear made up just under 20%; renewable wind
energy, hydropower, and solar energy were 8%, 7%, and 2%,

144. See How Many Power Plants Are There in the United States?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=65&t=2
(last
updated
Nov.
18,
2020)
[https://perma.cc/XLU5-BLLX] (“As of December 31, 2019, there were 22,731 electric generators at
about 10,346 utility-scale electric power plants in the United States. Utility-scale power plants
have a total nameplate electricity generation capacity of at least 1 megawatt (MW).”); James W.
Coleman & Alexandra B. Klass, Energy and Eminent Domain, 104 MINN. L. REV. 659, 692–97
(2019) (discussing the scale and scope of the electric grid).
145. See, e.g., GABRIEL CHAN, STEPHANIE LENHART, LINDSEY FORSBERG, MATTHEW GRIMLEY
& ELIZABETH WILSON, BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES IN
MINNESOTA’S MUNICIPAL UTILITIES AND ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES 9 (Feb. 2019),
https://hdl.handle.net/11299/201624 [https://perma.cc/ZHH6-9FK9] (discussing growth in
distributed energy resources).
146. See,
e.g.,
Electricity
Explained,
U.S.
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/electricity/electricity-in-the-us.php (last updated Mar. 18,
2021) [https://perma.cc/L4BE-BEDY]; Nadja Popovich & Brad Plumer, How Does Your State Make
Electricity?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2020) (showing change in electricity generation resources
nationwide and in each state from 2001 to 2019).
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respectively, and the remainder—mainly biomass and geothermal
energy—were just under 2%. 147
There are three different types of electric utilities that provide
power to end-use customers: (1) private investor-owned utilities, (2)
rural electric cooperatives, and (3) municipal utilities and other
government-owned “public power” providers. 148 Investor-owned
utilities—also known as a “publicly-regulated utilities” or “public
utilities”—are for-profit, private companies subject to long-standing
and extensive regulation by FERC and state public utility commissions
to ensure their rates (i.e., prices) for energy, transmission, and other
services are “just and reasonable” and nondiscriminatory. 149
Approximately 180 investor-owned utilities provide electricity to over
67% of U.S. residential, commercial, and industrial end-use
customers. 150 Over eight hundred rural electric cooperatives—memberowned, nonprofit entities exempt from most federal and state regulation
of prices and services 151—sell power to 13% of U.S. end-use electricity
customers in rural and, increasingly, suburban areas. 152 Municipal
utilities and other public power providers, which number over two
thousand, constitute approximately 14% of total electricity sales to U.S.
end-use customers. 153 Like rural electric cooperatives, municipal
utilities are exempt from FERC regulation under the Federal Power Act
and are subject to minimal, if any, regulation by state public utility
commissions as a matter of state law. 154 These public power providers
147. What Is U.S. Electricity Generation by Energy Source?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=427&t=3
(last
updated
Mar.
5,
2021)
[https://perma.cc/N27B-T3S6].
148. Investor-Owned Utilities Served 72% of U.S. Electricity Customers in 2017, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN. (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=40913
[https://perma.cc/W5XC-8TQA]; see also Jim Lazar, Electricity Regulation in the U.S.: A Guide,
REGUL. ASSISTANCE PROJECT 11–15 (2016) (discussing different types of electricity providers).
149. See KLASS & WISEMAN, supra note 12, at 193–94 (discussing regulation of investor-owned
utilities); see also William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1614,
1617–18 (2014) (discussing investor-owned utilities); William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents
of Federalism: Ratemaking and Policy Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 810,
822–35 (2016) (discussing state regulation of investor-owned utilities).
150. AM.
PUB.
POWER
ASS’N,
2021
STATISTICAL
REPORT
10
(2021),
https://www.publicpower.org/system/files/documents/2021-Public-power-Statistical-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5X34-8YZB]; see also Form EIA-861M (formerly EIA-826) Detailed Data, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia861m/ (last updated Sept. 29, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/EZ49-NGDR]; U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 148 (discussing different
types of electricity providers).
151. CHAN ET AL., supra note 145, at 10.
152. Electric Co-op Facts & Figures, NAT’L RURAL ELEC. COOP. ASS’N (July 19, 2021),
https://www.electric.coop/electric-cooperative-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/5T88-S2CR].
153. AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, Public Power for Your Community, supra note 30, at 12; CHAN ET
AL., supra note 145, at 10.
154. CHAN ET AL., supra note 145, at 10.
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are both large and small, ranging from the Los Angeles Department of
Water and Power serving over one million customers to thousands of
small and medium size cities and towns across the country. 155
FERC regulates wholesale sales of electricity in interstate
commerce and the transmission of electricity in interstate commerce
under the Federal Power Act to ensure that such sales are “just and
reasonable” and nondiscriminatory. 156 Importantly, the Federal Power
Act only regulates public utilities and exempts from the definition of
“public utility” all municipal utilities and virtually all rural electric
cooperatives. 157 Thus, the bulk of FERC regulation under the Federal
Power Act is directed to the actions of investor-owned utilities. As noted
above, states—which retain jurisdiction over retail and intrastate
electricity sales and transmission—either do not regulate or only lightly
regulate municipal utilities and rural electric cooperatives. 158
As recently as the 1990s, investor-owned utilities owned the
bulk of the nation’s power plants and were “vertically integrated”—
owning power plants and transmission and distribution assets, and
selling power at retail to end-use customers in state-authorized
monopoly territories at prices set by state public utility commissions
using cost-of-service ratemaking. 159 Beginning in the 1990s, however,
first FERC and, later, state legislatures began to lay the groundwork
for competition in wholesale and retail electricity markets. 160 This was
prompted both by market-based developments in other fields, such as
natural gas and telecommunications, as well as Congress’s enactment
of the Energy Policy Act of 1992, which gave FERC additional authority
to order utilities to grant transmission access to other power
generators. 161
In 1996, FERC enacted its landmark Order 888, which required
all transmission owners to provide “open access” transmission of energy
155. AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, Public Power for Your Community, supra note 30, at 7, 16–17.
156. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1); KLASS & WISEMAN, supra note 12, at 198–207 (discussing
federal regulation of investor-owned utilities). FERC does not regulate wholesale electricity sales
of the transmission of electricity in Texas, Alaska, or Hawaii because those states do not transmit
electricity in interstate commerce. Id. at 219–20; New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 7 (2002).
157. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(f) (excluding from regulation the United States, states, political
subdivisions of states, and electric cooperatives that meet certain requirements); Paul Ciampoli,
FERC Says It Does Not Have Jurisdiction Over JEA/MEAG Power PPA, AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N
(Feb.
22,
2019),
https://www.publicpower.org/periodical/article/ferc-says-it-does-not-havejurisdiction-over-jeameag-power-ppa [https://perma.cc/GR2N-ZFTA] (discussing scope of the
Federal Power Act’s exemption for municipal and other government electric utilities).
158. See supra Part I.D.
159. See KLASS & WISEMAN, supra note 12, at 203–07.
160. Id. at 204–07.
161. Id.; Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 721, 106 Stat. 2915 (amending
section 211 of the Federal Power Act).
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on a nondiscriminatory basis pursuant to a “transmission tariff” to any
electric generators that wished to use the line to sell power at wholesale
or retail on a space available basis. 162 Order 888, by providing enhanced
access to transmission services, allowed smaller power providers—
including municipal utilities without their own electric generating
plants—to purchase wholesale power more easily from a range of power
generators. This made these municipal utilities and other small power
providers far less dependent on investor-owned utilities which, for
decades, had used their monopoly power over the transmission grid to
block such electricity sales. 163 Today, independent power providers,
electric utilities, and other types of electricity generators and
transmission owners buy and sell a range of energy, transmission, and
ancillary services in wholesale markets that exist in approximately half
the country, called Regional Transmission Organizations (“RTOs”) or
Independent Service Operators (“ISOs”) with FERC oversight. 164
At the state level, the majority of states are “traditionally
regulated,” which means state law continues to allow all types of
electric utilities to remain vertically integrated and operate within
monopoly territories. 165 Since the late 1990s, however, seventeen states
(Texas, most northeast states, and a few midwestern states) have
“restructured” their electricity markets to at least some extent so that
investor-owned utilities operating in the state are no longer vertically
integrated and retail customers have a choice among electricity
providers. 166 New laws in these states required investor-owned utilities
to sell off most or all of their power plant assets and purchase the energy
they provide to retail customers from independent power producers and

162. Order No. 888, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Nondiscriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (Apr. 24, 1996) (codified at scattered
sections of 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 37, 385); KLASS & WISEMAN, supra note 12, at 205–06 (discussing
Order 888); New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002) (upholding Order 888 as within FERC’s
authority under the Federal Power Act).
163. See New York, 535 U.S. at 8–10 (discussing FERC justification for Order 888). Prior to
Order 888, investor-owned utilities, which owned the bulk of the nation’s electric transmission
infrastructure, could—and regularly did—use their monopoly power over the transmission grid to
block sales from energy generators to smaller electric utilities, forcing those utilities to purchase
both energy and transmission services from the investor-owned utility. See infra Part II.B
(discussing investor-owned utility exercise of monopoly power); see also KLASS & WISEMAN, supra
note 12, at 203–05.
164. RTOs and ISOs, FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, https://www.ferc.gov/industriesdata/electric/power-sales-and-markets/rtos-and-isos
(last
updated
Apr.
15,
2021)
[https://perma.cc/JSP8-ZQL6]; Boyd & Carlson, supra note 149, at 831–32 (discussing RTOs and
ISOs).
165. Lazar, supra note 148, at 13–14, 17–18.
166. Id. at 18–19.
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other power generators in RTO/ISO markets. 167 Investor-owned
utilities in those states generally still own the transmission and
distribution assets they use to transmit power to end-use customers,
but customers in many states can now choose alternative retail energy
providers. 168 Even in restructured states, however, rural electric
cooperatives and municipal utilities continue to serve monopoly
territories and thus are exempt from state laws providing retail choice
for customers of other electric utilities. 169
B. Municipalization Eras
Municipal utilities are as old as the electricity industry itself—
Wabash, Indiana, established the first such utility in 1880. 170 In the
early days of electrification, private utility companies as well as local
municipal utilities often competed for customers within the same
area. 171 At that time, state law nationwide generally required local
approval for private utilities to operate in a community through a
“franchise agreement.” 172 Today, such franchise agreements continue to
serve as the contractual agreement between a local government and a
private utility for the delivery of electricity to the local government’s
citizens. The basic form of the franchise agreement grants an investorowned utility the right to operate in the community and to use the city’s
rights-of-way in exchange for a franchise fee. 173 Franchise agreements
are long-term contracts with durations of ten, twenty, or even up to fifty
years. 174

167. Id.; Boyd & Carlson, supra note 149, at 837–38 (describing regulation of investor-owned
utilities in traditionally regulated and restructured states).
168. Boyd & Carlson, supra note 149, at 837–38; LISA M. QUILICI, DANIELLE S. POWERS, GREGG
H. THERRIEN, BENJAMIN O. DAVIS & OLIVIA A. PRIETO, CONCENTRIC ENERGY ADVISORS, INC.,
RETAIL COMPETITION IN ELECTRICITY: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED IN 20 YEARS? 15 (2019),
https://ceadvisors.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/AEPG-FINAL-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FJ5J-W79R] (discussing traditionally regulated and restructured states).
169. See, e.g., QUILICI ET AL., supra note 168, at 1 (“Municipal (‘Munis’) and Cooperative
(‘Coops’) utilities are typically exempted from retail restructuring.”).
170. Delia Patterson, Public Power: A Rich History, A Bright Future, AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N
(Feb.
15,
2018),
https://www.publicpower.org/blog/public-power-rich-history-bright-future
[https://perma.cc/7UGE-HZH8].
171. Welton, supra note 34, at 286.
172. Scott Ridley, Local Government: The Sleeping Giant in Electric Industry Restructuring,
10 ELEC. J., Nov. 1997, at 13, 16.
173. AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, Public Power for Your Community, supra note 30, at 14. In
practice, the investor-owned utility routinely passes on to consumers the costs of the franchise fee
instead of bearing them as legitimate business expense. Id.
174. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing duration of franchise agreements).
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1. Early Development of Municipal Utilities and Investor-Owned
Utilities
The first franchise agreements were nonexclusive, and it was
common for multiple private electric utilities to compete for the
opportunity to serve customers in a single locale. 175 As competition
failed to stabilize prices, 176 and as the “natural monopoly” tendencies of
the electricity industry became apparent, investor-owned utilities
increasingly sought to be the sole electricity provider in their area. 177
Eager to capture growing urban populations, 178 investor-owned utilities
regularly bribed local officials to sign exclusive franchise agreements
that favored their corporate interests which, unsurprisingly, led to
insufficient protection for consumers with regard to both price and
service. 179
The earliest municipalization campaigns to sever ties with
existing investor-owned utilities responded to community frustration
with these predatory contracts. 180 Proponents of municipalization
hoped to “lower electricity rates and raise living standards, end bribery
of city officials, and increase public participation in local

175. See William J. Hausman & John L. Neufeld, The Market for Capital and the Origins of
State Regulation of Electric Utilities in the United States, 62 J. ECON. HIST. 1050, 1054 (2002)
(documenting the competition for franchise agreements in New York and Chicago); DAVID W.
WILMA, WALT CROWLEY & THE HISTORYLINK STAFF, POWER FOR THE PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF
SEATTLE CITY LIGHT 34, 48–49, 57, 62 (2010) (discussing ongoing competition for customers
between Seattle municipal utilities and investor-owned utilities).
176. See Shelley Ross Saxer, Government Power Unleashed: Using Eminent Domain to Acquire
a Public Utility or Other Ongoing Enterprise, 38 IND. L. REV. 55, 61 (2005) (competition created
“price wars” resulting in “deteriorated operations and service”); Ridley, supra note 172, at 16
(“Public scandal and criticism . . . emerged over the competition between private utilities for local
franchises.”).
177. Boyd, supra note 149, at 1639 (“[T]he basic idea [of the natural monopoly] being that
because of declining average costs across the relevant demand curve, the [electric] industry was
served most cost-effectively by a single firm.”).
178. Saxer, supra note 176, at 61.
179. See Welton, supra note 34, at 286 (describing investor-owned utilities’ lack of incentive to
maintain quality of service); Outka, supra note 36, at 112 (noting consumer “[d]issatisfaction with
private utilities”). Even Thomas Edison deployed worldly enticements to obtain his franchise
agreement for New York City. See Thomas P. Hughes, The Electrification of America: The System
Builders, 20 TECH. & CULTURE 124, 131 (1979) (describing Edison’s presentation of a “lavish
‘spread’ from famous Delmonico’s,” one of New York’s finest restaurants, to the mayor and a cohort
of aldermen).
180. See Outka, supra note 36, at 112 (citing Carmen Randolph, Municipal Ownership of
Public Utilities, 22 YALE L.J. 461, 476 (1913)) (observing “the early ‘campaign for municipal
ownership’ as stemming from anger against investor-owned utilities for their ‘greed,’ ‘negligence,’
and ‘overreaching the community in getting franchises’ ”).
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government.” 181 Alternatively, smaller communities spurned by
investor-owned utilities from the outset for lack of profit potential had
no choice but to create their own electric utilities. 182 By 1907, municipal
utilities supplied 30% of electricity in the United States and popular
enthusiasm for public power showed little sign of slowing down. 183
Large urban centers embraced municipalization early in the twentieth
century—Cleveland in 1906, 184 Los Angeles in 1909, 185 and Seattle in
1910, 186 all of which remain municipal utilities today.
As municipalization threatened private utilities’ bottom lines,
industry leaders began to strategize as early as 1904 about how to
cement private ownership as the prevailing utility model. 187 Samuel
Insull, founder of Commonwealth Edison, convinced his peers to pursue
state regulation on grounds that if “efficient,” it could secure “fair
treatment” for the public, placate municipalization advocates, and
ensure the long-term dominance of investor-owned utilities. 188 In
exchange for submitting to state regulatory oversight of electricity rates
and charges, an investor-owned utility would be guaranteed an
exclusive franchise in its territory as well as the certainty needed to
attract financing for the capital-intensive infrastructure development
required to provide electricity to the public. 189
Aiding these efforts to persuade the public—and state
legislatures—of the benefits of the new regulatory scheme was evidence
that municipal ownership had failed to prevent “widespread corruption”
in local government. 190 Criticism of public ownership as an anti-

181. Welton, supra note 34, at 286–87.
182. DAVID E. NYE, ELECTRIFYING AMERICA: SOCIAL MEANINGS OF A NEW TECHNOLOGY 18801940, at 179 (1990).
183. Welton, supra note 34, at 287 (citing RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF
DEREGULATION AND RESTRUCTURING IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM 15 (1999)).
184. History, CLEV. PUB. POWER, https://www.cpp.org/history (last visited Oct. 3, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/3Y7J-W7Y6].
185. The construction of the Los Angeles Aqueduct, which brought both water and electricity
to the city, precipitated the establishment of the Bureau of Los Angeles Aqueduct Power,
predecessor to the current Los Angeles Department of Water and Power. Power: Past, L.A. DEP’T
WATER
&
POWER,
https://www.ladwp.com/ladwp/faces/ladwp/aboutus/a-power/a-pOF
pastandpresent/a-p-pp-past? (last visited Dec. 21, 2021) [https://perma.cc/K7F9-RSBR].
186. Similar to Los Angeles, a 1902 hydroelectric project on the Cedar River led to the later
creation of Seattle’s electric utility. About Us: History, SEATTLE CITY LIGHT,
https://www.seattle.gov/light/history/brief.asp (last visited Oct. 3, 2021) [https://perma.cc/HV2DX966].
187. That year, the trade association of private electric utilities formed a committee to study
the seriousness of this threat. Alan Richardson & John Kelly, The Relevance and Importance of
Public Power in the United States, 19 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 54, 55 (2005).
188. Id.
189. Boyd, supra note 149, at 1643.
190. Id. at 1640–41.
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American, socialist menace to free enterprise also contributed to
shifting popular sentiment. 191
From these successful lobbying efforts were born state public
utility commissions, premised on the idea that an independent scientific
commission could best balance ratepayer and shareholder interests. 192
The first commissions were created in Wisconsin and New York in 1907,
and by 1930 every state except Delaware had one. 193 The establishment
of public utility commissions did not immediately stem the tide of
municipalization, and publicly owned electric utilities reached a peak
of almost 3,100 in 1923. 194
Though state public utility commissions helped moderate prices,
they could not prevent the period of rampant consolidation of investorowned utilities that followed their creation. In the absence of federal
regulation to restrain the mergers of private utility holding companies,
by the mid-1930s less than two dozen private companies controlled the
bulk of the nation’s electricity sector. 195 Public systems were purchased
by and absorbed into these now massive corporations as they realized
economies of scale. 196 In 1932, while essentially acknowledging the
ubiquity of investor-owned utilities, presidential candidate Franklin
Delano Roosevelt touted municipalization as an important
counterweight and bargaining chip for local governments:
[T]he very fact that a community can, by vote of the electorate, create a yardstick of its
own, will, in most cases, guarantee good service and low rates to its population. I might
call the right of the people to own and operate their own utility something like this: a
“birch rod” in the cupboard to be taken out and used only when the “child” gets beyond
the point where a mere scolding does no good. 197

191. Saxer, supra note 176, at 61–62; see also RICHARD RUDOLPH & SCOTT RIDLEY, POWER
STRUGGLE 32 (1986) (detailing the prolonged fights over whether local governments or private
companies would “control electricity” with the stakes including “the control not only of markets
and geographic territories, but the expansion of political and economic influence, and ultimately
the future of an industry to be worth hundreds of billions of dollars”).
192. Boyd, supra note 149, at 1641.
193. Id. at 1640.
194. Richardson & Kelly, supra note 187, at 55.
195. Garrick B. Pursley & Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. 877, 906 (2011).
Samuel Insull typified the voracious appetite of private companies in this period; in 1930, the
utilities he controlled produced one-tenth of America’s electricity. Richardson & Kelly, supra note
187, at 55. The Insull “monstrosity,” so-called by then-presidential candidate Franklin Delano
Roosevelt, collapsed in a series of corporate investment scandals directly tied to the byzantine
structuring of his holding companies. Id.; see also JOHN F. WASIK, THE MERCHANT OF POWER: SAM
INSULL, THOMAS EDISON, AND THE CREATION OF THE MODERN METROPOLIS 143–207 (2006).
196. Welton, supra note 34, at 289; see also Outka, supra note 36, at 114 (noting a “dramatic
consolidation effect”).
197. Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the U.S., Campaign Address in Portland, Oregon on
Public Utilities and Development of Hydro-Electric Power (Sept. 21, 1932),
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/campaign-address-portland-oregon-public-utilitiesand-development-hydro-electric-power [https://perma.cc/J6Z2-6JPA].
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By the time Congress enacted New Deal legislation in the 1930s
to address the monopolistic expansion of utility holding companies, 198
municipalization had lost its momentum. 199 One significant exception
to that trend was Nebraska, which used the leverage created by the new
federal legislation to support municipal and other public power utilities’
buyout of all the investor-owned utilities in the state. 200 Nebraska
remains the only state where all residential, commercial, and industrial
customers are served by public power utilities and rural electric
cooperatives. 201
2. Investor-Owned Utilities on Offense
From the 1930s until the 1990s, public power then entered a
period of stasis, 202 with relatively few communities pursuing
municipalization. When local governments did attempt to municipalize
in this period, they faced protracted obstruction from investor-owned
utilities loathe to relinquish territory. Sacramento’s struggle to
establish its own utility and the well-known tale of subterfuge by Otter
Tail Power Company in Minnesota exemplify the tactics employed by
investor-owned utilities to stymie municipalization campaigns.
Sacramento citizens voted overwhelmingly to establish a public
power system in 1923, 203 although it took the city more than two
decades to break away from Pacific Gas & Electric (“PG&E”) and
establish the Sacramento Municipal Utility District (“SMUD”).
Frustration with PG&E’s failure to follow through on a promised
hydroelectric project motivated the effort. 204 Once local advocates
mustered enough support to purchase PG&E’s assets, 205 PG&E
launched a suite of legal attacks against the city. It appealed the
198. See Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-333, 49 Stat. 803, 803–
38 (repealed 2005).
199. Welton, supra note 34, at 288.
200. DON SCHAUFELBERGER & BILL BECK, THE ONLY STATE: A HISTORY OF PUBLIC POWER IN
NEBRASKA 138–46 (2010).
201. Id.; see also About Our Members, NEB. RURAL ELEC. COOP. ASS’N,
https://www.nrea.org/our-members/about-our-members
(last
visited
Dec.
21,
2021)
[https://perma.cc/965X94PF].
202. The number of municipal electric systems has hovered around two thousand since the
1950s. Welton, supra note 34, at 290.
203. Eighty-seven percent of voters approved the initial referendum to municipalize. Lance
Armstrong, SMUD’s History Began Through Local Voters’ Approval in 1923, VALLEY CMTY.
NEWSPAPERS (Aug. 8, 2015), https://www.valcomnews.com/smud%E2%80%99s-history-beganthrough-local-voters%E2%80%99-approval-in-1923/ [https://perma.cc/23AA-QDVQ].
204. Nicholas Iovino, Public v. Private: How a State Takeover of PG&E Might Look in
California, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.courthousenews.com/public-vprivate-how-a-state-takeover-of-pge-might-look-in-california/ [https://perma.cc/3NEK-839Q].
205. Voters approved a $12 million bond for the acquisition in 1934. Id.
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validation of the bonds issued for the asset purchase on the grounds
that the taxes necessary to pay for the bonds would constitute a taking
of its property. 206 When the appeal proved unsuccessful, PG&E filed its
own lawsuit in federal court on the same grounds but did not prevail. 207
PG&E continued to litigate—challenging the valuation of its property
in SMUD’s condemnation proceeding—but lost again. 208 SMUD finally
began operation in 1946. 209
One of the most well-known municipalization battles in energy
law and antitrust circles involves efforts by small towns in South
Dakota, North Dakota, and Minnesota to create municipal utilities to
replace Minnesota-based investor-owned utility Otter Tail Power
Company. 210 Twelve towns endeavored to replace Otter Tail with their
own municipal utility between 1945 and 1970, but aggressive litigation
by Otter Tail ultimately caused all but three of them to give up and
renew their franchise agreements. 211 Otter Tail rejected requests to sell
electricity at wholesale for distribution by the towns, 212 and then, when
the towns found other power suppliers, Otter Tail refused to allow use
of its transmission lines to deliver the electricity. 213 The substantial
costs of building new transmission infrastructure meant it was not
“economically feasible or practical” for the towns to obtain power by any
other means. 214 Like PG&E, Otter Tail also used coercive litigation to
weaken the towns’ resolve:
[T]he litigation sponsored by [Otter Tail] was carried to the highest available appellate
court and although all of it was unsuccessful on the merits, the institution and
maintenance of it had the effect of halting, or appreciably slowing, efforts for municipal
ownership. The delay thus occasioned and the large financial burden imposed on the
206. See Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist. v. All Parties, 57 P.2d 506 (Cal. 1936) (upholding the
validity of the bonds).
207. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 92 F.2d 365, 368 (9th Cir. 1937),
cert. denied, 303 U.S. 640 (1938) (“The [municipal electric] district is not required to spring, like
Minerva, full panoplied from its Jovian head, the state of California.”); see also Sacramento Mun.
Util. Dist. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 128 P.2d 529 (Cal. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 759 (1943)
(awarding SMUD attorneys’ fees for its defense in the prior cases).
208. See Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 165 P.2d 741 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1946).
209. Our History, SACRAMENTO MUN. UTIL. DIST, https://www.smud.org/en/Corporate/Aboutus/Company-Information/Our-History (last visited Dec. 21, 2021) [https://perma.cc/N75Z-VARX].
210. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States (Otter Tail Power Co. II), 410 U.S. 366, 370
(1973).
211. Id.
212. United States v. Otter Tail Power Co. (Otter Tail Power Co. I), 331 F. Supp. 54, 60 (D.
Minn. 1971), aff’d in part, vacated in part, Otter Tail Power Co. II, 410 U.S. at 366.
213. Otter Tail Power Co. I, 331 F. Supp. at 62.
214. Id. at 59–60 (footnote omitted). Even when the town of Elbow Lake, Minnesota, managed
to build its own generation plant, it had to rely on Otter Tail for backup capacity. Id. at 60. Otter
Tail refused to provide it until ordered by the Federal Power Commission. Id. (citing Otter Tail
Power Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 429 F.2d 232 (8th Cir. 1970)).
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towns’ limited treasury dampened local enthusiasm for public ownership. In some
instances, Otter Tail made offers to the towns to absorb the towns’ costs and expenses,
and enhance the quality of its service in exchange for a new franchise. 215

Rejecting Otter Tail’s claims that municipalization would lead
to its demise, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Otter Tail had violated
the Sherman Antitrust Act and upheld the district court’s remedy for
the violation by requiring Otter Tail to allow its transmission lines to
be used to “wheel” power to the towns. 216 According to the Court,
although Otter Tail lawfully held a monopoly in its territory, its refusal
to deal with the towns in terms of providing wholesale power and
transmission services constituted an impermissible attempt to preserve
that monopoly power. 217 While Otter Tail was eventually forced to
cooperate with the remaining towns that had not yet renewed their
franchise agreements, its tactics illustrate the uphill battle local
governments face when trying to municipalize. The resource mismatch
between local governments and increasingly larger investor-owned
utilities helps explain why between 1947 and 1996, only 125 new
municipal electric systems were formed. 218
3. The Deregulation Era of the 1990s
A new era of interest in municipalization began in the 1990s, as
the changes wrought by deregulation of wholesale electricity sales
presented an opportunity to lower power supply costs. 219 First, the rise
of independent power producers after the Energy Policy Act of 1992 led
to the development of smaller, more efficient generation sources like
combined-cycle natural gas plants. 220 Second, FERC’s Order 888
requiring open-access transmission and newly created RTO/ISO
markets meant municipal utilities could purchase this cheaper
electricity if they qualified as “resellers.” 221
To qualify, the wholesale purchaser had to use “transmission or
distribution facilities that it owns or controls” to deliver the electricity
to the final retail customer, 222 thus spurring the drive by local
governments to acquire these facilities through the creation of a
municipal utility. Additionally, many local governments hoped to lower
their citizens’ electricity rates by no longer paying for poor decisions
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 62 (footnote omitted).
See Otter Tail Power Co. II, 410 U.S. at 374–76.
See Otter Tail Power Co. I, 331 F. Supp. at 62.
See Doane & Spulber, supra note 108, at 350–51.
See supra Part II.A.
Kelly, supra note 108, at 47.
Id. at 48; see also supra Part II.A.
Federal Power Act § 212, 16 U.S.C. § 824k(h)(2)(B).
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made by their investor-owned utilities in the 1970s, when a
miscalculation of load forecast led many to overbuild generation
capacity. 223 In this way, local governments also viewed
municipalization as a means of reasserting local control over their
energy decisions.
The renewed attention to municipalization generated lively
debate about public power’s place in a competitive market. 224 Scholars
in support pointed to the “long pro-competitive history of public power”
to reject the contention that restructuring in the industry rendered it
obsolete. 225 Writing in the midst of this transition, David Penn argued
public power helped all consumers, not just the municipal utility’s local
customers, by “delivering the benefits of diversity, comparison, choice,
and a cost-effective insurance policy against the risks that electricity
industry restructuring may not go as well as hoped for.” 226 However,
despite more than forty active municipalization campaigns in 1997, 227
many local governments abandoned municipalization when faced with
the daunting realities of the lengthy process of establishing their own
utility and engaging in protracted litigation with the investor-owned
utility to condemn the necessary transmission and distribution
facilities to operate the new utility. 228
4. Contemporary Municipalization Efforts
Local governments contemplating municipalization in recent
years have aimed to achieve some of the same objectives as their
predecessors of the early twentieth century—reduced rates, reliable
service, and enhanced local control. While investor-owned utilities were
able to persuade the public in the early twentieth century that state
public utility commissions could better ensure affordability than
publicly owned utilities when all models of utility ownership were new
and untested, data now shows that municipal utility customers pay the
lowest average rates across all customer classes. 229 Reliability and
223. See Kelly, supra note 108, at 46–47.
224. See, e.g., Richardson & Kelly, supra note 187, at 56 (“Regulators, economists, and industry
leaders suggested that public power could not survive in such an environment, and in any case, its
very existence was incompatible with such an environment.”).
225. See, e.g., David Penn, Competition, the Consumer, and Local Decision Making: Public
Power’s Important Role, 10 ELEC. J., Nov. 1997, at 30, 32 (“Public power is well positioned to play
an important role in the electricity industry’s future.”).
226. Id. at 36.
227. Doane & Spulber, supra note 108, at 333.
228. See id. at 350 (describing the deterrent effect of the legal, transactional, reputational, and
financial costs of condemnation).
229. See AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, Public Power for Your Community, supra note 30, at 20 (“On
a national basis, average electricity rates for all investor-owned utility customers in all customer
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rapid response to outages continue to be high priorities for consumers,
especially with the increased incidence of extreme weather events;
public power customers experience fewer outages of shorter duration
than customers of investor-owned utilities. 230 And it remains true that
public power entities are more accountable to ratepayers than investorowned utilities, since they are subject to mechanisms like open meeting
laws, citizen advisory committees, and the democratic process. 231
Contemporary public power advocates, however, are motivated
by a host of additional interrelated policy goals including racial equity,
addressing climate change, economic development, integrating new
technologies, and enhanced local involvement in energy systems. All of
these goals can be understood as facets of energy democracy, a concept
often escaping precise definition 232 but generally encompassing “a
vision to restructure the energy future based on inclusive engagement,
where genuine participation in democratic processes provides
community control and renewable energy generates local, equitably
distributed wealth.” 233
a. Energy Democracy and Self-Determination for Local Governments
Shelley Welton has identified three main themes within the
concept of energy democracy—consumer choice, local control, and
access to process. 234 Consumer choice entails giving consumers more
options in energy purchasing decisions, such as the type of resource
generating their electricity (with a general preference for renewable
energy) as well as the locus of its production (centralized or
distributed). 235 Local control embeds decisionmaking authority over
these choices within the community itself. 236 Lastly, access to process
classes are 6.9 percent higher than average rates paid by public power customers.” (emphasis
omitted)).
230. See Anodyne Lindstrom & Sara Hoff, U.S. Customers Experienced an Average of Nearly
Six Hours of Power Interruptions in 2018, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 1, 2020),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=43915
[https://perma.cc/G3U3-DZPF]
(comparing outages of customers served by publicly owned utilities with those served by investorowned utilities).
231. See AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, Public Power for Your Community, supra note 30, at 12. By
contrast, “the typical investor-owned utility has a large service territory and will likely have its
headquarters located far away; board meetings are conducted in private, and decisions are made
behind closed doors.” Id.
232. See Welton, supra note 35, at 585 (exploring the different and sometimes conflicting
meanings of “energy democracy” within literature about energy reform).
233. Bozuwa, supra note 6, at 1.
234. Welton, supra note 35, at 585.
235. See id.
236. See id. at 613 (“Calls for localism demand that control be devolved from higher levels of
government, and that control be more directly public, via either direct public ownership or other
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increases the amount of meaningful participation in decisionmaking
among citizens. 237
The municipalization effort by the City of Boulder, Colorado,
illustrates this trend. In 2010, Boulder citizens voted overwhelmingly
to authorize a tax of $4 million per year to support the city’s efforts to
create a locally owned utility to replace the investor-owned utility Xcel
Energy, which had provided electricity services to the city for decades
under long-term franchise agreements. 238 Driving the municipalization
effort was a desire to shift to providing citizens with 100% renewable
energy, unhappiness with the pace of Xcel’s decarbonization efforts, and
the goal of creating a local utility that “will support a robust energy
economy, with more control of energy supply and investments, as well
as community participation in the creation of services.” 239
Over the next decade, Boulder spent over $27 million on efforts
to acquire the physical facilities and other rights needed to create a local
utility, engaged in protracted litigation with Xcel over acquisition of
physical facilities and how to value those facilities, and watched as Xcel
responded to pressure by Boulder and other franchise cities by adopting
aggressive corporate decarbonization goals for its operations across the
country. 240 Nevertheless, municipalization remained popular in the
community throughout 2013 and 2014, with voters approving a price
cap on the cost of acquisition of Xcel’s infrastructure and the city council
passing two critical ordinances—one formally authorizing the
acquisition of Xcel’s facilities and another establishing a “light and
power utility.” 241

forms of directly controlling utility decisionmaking. Energy is thus democratized by putting people
back in charge.” (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
237. See id.
OUR
FUTURE,
238. Boulder
Local
Power:
A
History,
EMPOWER
https://empowerourfuture.org/boulder-municipalization-a-history/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/5AG7-PFML].
OF
BOULDER,
239. Local
Power,
CITY
https://web.archive.org/web/20201204211739/https:/bouldercolorado.gov/local-power
[https://perma.cc/9LRZ-ZT7F].
240. See Shay Castle, Xcel, Boulder, Reach Muni-Ending Deal for Voters to Weigh this Fall,
BEAT
(July
28,
2020),
https://boulderbeat.news/2020/07/28/boulder-xcelBOULDER
municipalization-settlement/ [https://perma.cc/4LAA-NEDS]; Working with Xcel Energy, CITY OF
BOULDER,
https://web.archive.org/web/20210705034122/https:/bouldercolorado.gov/localpower/working-with-xcel-energy [https://perma.cc/3HZT-Y2CW].
241. See City Council Agenda Item: Update on Boulder’s Energy Future Municipalization
Exploration Project, CITY OF BOULDER 2 (Dec. 17, 2013); Pub. Serv. Co. v. City of Boulder (Pub.
Serv. Co. I), 410 P.3d 680, 682 (Colo. App. 2016) (describing enactment of Ordinances 7918 and
7969), rev’d, Pub. Serv. Co. II, 420 P.3d 289 (Colo. 2018); Pub. Serv. Co. II, 420 P.3d at 292
(describing Xcel’s challenge to Ordinances 7918 and 7969).
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In 2019, Xcel ignored three offers by Boulder to purchase Xcel’s
assets—starting at $68.5 million 242 and increasing to a final offer just
shy of $94 million 243—prompting the city to begin condemnation
proceedings in court. 244 Facing strained financial health due to the
COVID-19 pandemic on top of regulatory and legal challenges from
Xcel, the city revised its municipalization plan in July 2020 to delay any
final go/no-go vote. 245 Despite the active desire of many community
members to continue with municipalization, the city council decided to
put a new franchise agreement with Xcel on the ballot instead. In
November 2020, voters narrowly passed the franchise measure and
approved a new partnership with Xcel along with it. 246
However, Boulder’s decision to ultimately sign a new franchise
agreement does not mean its municipalization effort was for naught, as
Xcel’s engagement with decarbonization has accelerated appreciably
since the initial negotiations in 2008. Xcel has since moved to convert
or decommission multiple coal plants serving Boulder, 247 and in 2018
Xcel became the first investor-owned utility in the country to commit to
242. City Offers Xcel Energy Nearly $94 Million for Assets Necessary for Local Electric Utility,
CITY
OF
BOULDER
(Nov.
22,
2019),
https://web.archive.org/web/20201204030919/https:/bouldercolorado.gov/newsroom/city-offersxcel-energy-nearly-94-million-for-assets-necessary-for-local-electric-utility
[https://perma.cc/EQ5L-9PNR].
243. Notice of Intent to Acquire & Final Offer Letter from Lyman R. Ho, Land Acquisition
Strategies LLC, on behalf of the City of Boulder, to John Lupo, Senior Manager, Siting & Land
Rights,
Xcel
Energy
Servs.,
Inc.
(Nov.
20,
2019),
https://wwwstatic.bouldercolorado.gov/docs/NOI_and_Final_Offer_11-20-19-1-201911211325.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J867-NXYG].
244. CITY OF BOULDER, supra note 242. Colorado allows a municipality to either purchase or
condemn at fair market value an incumbent provider’s system. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-15707(1)(a)(II) (West 2021).
245. See Jane S. Brautigam et al., Information Item: Boulder’s Local Power/Municipalization
Update,
CITY
OF
BOULDER,
at
3–4
(July
21,
2020),
https://wwwstatic.bouldercolorado.gov/docs/Local_Power_Muni__Update_Q1_Q2_2020_FINAL-1202007160858.pdf [https://perma.cc/J52T-4AXW].
246. Boulder Voters Pass New Franchise with Xcel Energy and Partnership-Funding Measure,
PROGRESSIVE PARTY U.S.A., https://progressivepartyusa.com/climate-change/boulder-voters-passnew-franchise-with-xcel-energy-and-partnership-funding-measure/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/KY2Y-YAKA]; see also Deborah Swearingen, Organization Key as Boulder Moves
Forward with Xcel Franchise, Partnership, DAILY CAMERA (Nov. 7, 2020, 10:00 AM),
https://www.dailycamera.com/2020/11/07/organization-key-as-boulder-moves-forward-with-xcelfranchise-partnership/ [https://perma.cc/L3PK-XCCY] (“With 53% of the vote, the franchise
agreement had the tightest margins of the five Boulder ballot initiatives.”).
247. See Xcel: Valmont Plant Has “Burned Its Last Trainload of Coal,” POWER ENG’G (Apr. 10,
2017), https://www.power-eng.com/coal/xcel-valmont-plant-has-burned-its-last-trainload-of-coal/
[https://perma.cc/746B-E9L6] (describing conversion of last coal-fired unit at Valmont Power
Station to natural gas); Miranda Willson, Colo.’s Largest Utility Announces Shutdown of Coal
WIND
&
SOLAR
ENERGY
COAL.
(Jan.
6,
2021),
Plant,
GOVERNORS’
https://governorswindenergycoalition.org/colo-s-largest-utility-announces-shutdown-of-coal-plant/
[https://perma.cc/JW6X-9WQY] (noting Xcel’s plan to close its coal-fired Hayden Generating
Station eight years ahead of schedule).
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100% decarbonization of its fuel supply. 248 Moreover, the new franchise
agreement contains significant additional conditions for Xcel regarding
community input on grid planning, graduated emissions caps, and
undergrounding investment, and gives Boulder the right to restart
municipalization efforts if Xcel does not meet those conditions. 249
In other cities, municipalization efforts continue, with a focus on
spurring economic investment in the community, addressing historical
inequities, integrating new technologies, and reducing carbon
emissions. For example, as of 2021, New York City was considering
municipalization to make its energy system “safer, greener, cheaper,
and more accountable to the public” following a series of “unexplained”
blackouts by Consolidated Edison in 2019 and 2020. 250 Noting that
“deferral of necessary repairs, a near complete lack of transparency,
and little to no true accountability” are conditions “endemic” to
investor-owned utilities, the city aims to “ensure a just and expeditious
transition to a renewable energy future” which is also cost effective. 251
In Chicago, dissatisfaction with Commonwealth Edison
(“ComEd”) led the city to consider municipalization in 2019 as the end
of its franchise agreement approached. 252 Signed in 1991, Chicago’s
franchise agreement was the first in the nation to incorporate any
substantive energy policy goals. 253 It is not surprising, then, that the
city’s municipalization investigation was informed by a number of
goals: affordable, reliable power; environmental stewardship; support
for economically disadvantaged neighborhoods and communities;
investment in new technology; and support for minority- and womenowned businesses. 254 The Chicago chapter of the Democratic Socialists
of America launched a #DemocratizeComEd campaign, explaining that

248. Julia Pyper, Xcel Energy Commits to 100% Carbon-Free Electricity by 2050, GREENTECH
MEDIA (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/xcel-commits-to-100-carbonfree-electricity-by-20501 [https://perma.cc/AN7A-U7RE] (quoting Xcel’s CEO Ben Fowke: “We’re
accelerating our carbon-reduction goals because we’re encouraged by advances in technology,
motivated by customers who are asking for it and committed to working with partners to make it
happen . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
OF
BOULDER,
249. City
of
Boulder
Xcel
Energy
Partnership,
CITY
https://web.archive.org/web/20210627181537/https://bouldercolorado.gov/energy-future/xcelpartnership [https://perma.cc/BL2K-KTUA].
250. OFF. OF THE N.Y.C. PUB. ADVOC., supra note 6, at 2.
251. Id. at 1.
252. See Iulia Gheorghiu, Cutting Ties with ComEd Could Cost Chicago $8.8B, Report Finds,
UTIL. DIVE (Sept. 1, 2020), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/cutting-ties-with-comed-could-costchicago-88b-report-finds/584474/ [https://perma.cc/43CB-H886].
253. See Cook et al., supra note 99, at 1.
254. NEWGEN STRATEGIES & SOLS., supra note 105, at 3-1.
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as a private monopoly, ComEd is “minimally accountable, not
transparent and just is outside of our public control.” 255
Chicago’s pursuit of municipalization came to a swift end after
its feasibility study determined that taking over ComEd’s
infrastructure would be prohibitively expensive and result in higher
rates through 2039. 256 However, in the wake of ComEd’s bribery
scandal, 257 Mayor Lori Lightfoot’s administration continued to place the
pursuit of “Energy and Equity” at the center of franchise
negotiations. 258 Lightfoot emphasized any new agreement would need
to include “expansive ethics reforms,” as well as elimination of late fees
and disconnections, improved infrastructure in the South and West
Sides, and a commitment to diversity hiring targets. 259 In short,
Chicago viewed the franchise agreement as an opening to extract a
“significant commitment from [ComEd] to right historic wrongs.” 260
While negotiations with ComEd were ongoing in 2021, Mayor Lightfoot
solicited other utilities for proposals to take over providing electricity
for the city that incorporates these terms. 261

255. Alex Schwartz, Whose Grid? Our Grid! Chicago’s Campaign to Put Electricity Under
Public Control, IN THESE TIMES (Sept. 17, 2019), https://inthesetimes.com/article/chicagodemocratic-socialists-comed-municipalization-electric-utility
[https://perma.cc/7FAZ-BVVK]
(internal quotation marks omitted).
256. Gheorghiu, supra note 252.
257. See, e.g., Iulia Gheorghiu, ComEd Admits to Bribery Charge in Illinois, Agrees to Pay
$200M Fine, UTIL. DIVE (July 20, 2020), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/comed-admits-tobribery-charge-in-illinois-agrees-to-pay-200m-fine/ [https://perma.cc/WY9F-YDFQ].
258. Brett Chase, Lightfoot to ComEd: End Shutoffs, Commit to Ethics Reform and Clean
Energy to Keep City Franchise, CHI. SUN TIMES (Sept. 22, 2020), https://chicago.suntimes.com/cityhall/2020/9/22/21451064/comed-chicago-franchise-agreement-lightfoot-demands-disconnectionsclimate-change [https://perma.cc/BQ4W-FY62].
259. Letter from Lori E. Lightfoot, Mayor, City of Chi., to Joe Dominguez,
CEO, Commonwealth Edison Co., at 1, 3 (Sept. 21, 2020), https://news.wttw.com/sites/default/file
s/article/file-attachments/9.21.20%20Letter%20to%20Joseph%20Dominguez.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5G8Q-UC5M].
260. David Roeder & Fran Spielman, To Keep Franchise, ComEd Must
Reform, Lightfoot Warns, CHI. SUN TIMES (July 27, 2020), https://chicago.suntimes.com/cityhall/2020/7/27/21341075/comed-chicago-franchise-lightfoot-warns-ceo-ethics-reform-madigan
[https://perma.cc/BKX6-CZ3F] (internal quotation marks omitted).
261. See Mariah Woelfel, Chicago Seeks Competitors For ComEd’s Utility Franchise Deal
Within the City, WBEZ CHI., https://www.wbez.org/stories/chicago-seeks-competitors-for-comedsutility-franchise-deal-with-the-city/51ed3d0a-a2e5-4052-be4d-da6c5fbb61da (last updated Apr.
30, 2021, 4:23 PM) [https://perma.cc/4JGL-44GQ]; Heather Cherone, While ComEd Negotiations
Remain Stalled, Lightfoot Extends Deadline for New Proposals, WTTW NEWS (June 7, 2021, 2:37
PM),
https://news.wttw.com/2021/06/07/while-comed-negotiations-remain-stalled-lightfootextends-deadline-new-proposals [https://perma.cc/Z62W-T2QX]. As of August 2021, negotiations
with ComEd remained at an impasse. Becky Vevea, Why the Talks to Renew ComEd’s Deal
4:14
PM),
to Supply Power to Chicago Are Stalled, WBEZ CHI. (June 10, 2021,
https://www.wbez.org/stories/why-the-talks-to-renew-comeds-deal-to-supply-power-to-chicagoare-stalled/d8f77785-f2ba-4b76-98e2-0a97986e84e5 [https://perma.cc/U484-RWV7].
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In California, as of 2021 PG&E was confronting calls for its
ouster in communities across the state because of a deterioration in
safety and reliability, liability for catastrophic wildfires in the state in
2019 and 2020, and evidence of budget manipulation. 262 In San
Francisco, officials viewed replacing PG&E as a way to more actively
achieve clean energy and equity goals: “Public power expansion
provides the opportunity for the City to significantly increase its own
[energy efficiency, low-income and community development] program
offerings, and to align those programs with San Francisco’s legislative
priorities and policies, such as the GHG target of net zero emissions by
2050 and electrification of transportation.” 263 Facing mounting debt
from the repercussions of wildfire damage, PG&E filed for bankruptcy
in January 2019, prompting San Francisco to offer $2.5 billion for its
distribution assets in the city. 264 PG&E mostly skirted these existential
threats to its business by restructuring its debt, establishing a fund to
compensate wildfire victims, and paying penalties to the California
Public Utilities Commission. 265 However, in 2021, as evidence mounted
that PG&E was potentially responsible for sparking the Dixie Fire, the
largest single fire in California’s history, the utility faced growing
pressures to undertake significant reforms. 266
262. See Tom Perkins, Publicly Owned Utilities “Not a Panacea” But Can Produce Customer
Benefits, ENERGY NEWS NETWORK (Dec. 16, 2019), https://energynews.us/2019/12/16/publiclyowned-utilities-not-a-panacea-but-can-produce-customer-benefits/ [https://perma.cc/Z877-XC79]
(“Critics say PG&E has prioritized profits over system maintenance.”); J.D. Morris, PG&E
Diverted Millions From Putting Lines Underground, Audit Finds, S.F. CHRON.,
https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/PG-E-diverted-millions-from-burying-overhead14897319.php (last updated Dec. 11, 2019, 4:00 AM) [https://perma.cc/5B7F-B9W6] (describing
diversion of $123 million intended for undergrounding to unknown expenses); Sonja Hutson, San
Francisco Offers to Buy PG&E Electric Grid in the City for $2.5 Billion, KQED (Sept. 8, 2019),
https://www.kqed.org/news/11773007/san-francisco-offers-to-buy-pge-electric-grid-in-the-city-for2-5-billion [https://perma.cc/CQ5W-MCRD].
263. S.F. WATER POWER SEWER, supra note 105, at 28.
264. Hutson, supra note 262; Marisa Lagos, Lisa Pickoff-White & Dan Brekke, PG&E Files for
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, KQED (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.kqed.org/news/11721861/pge-files-forchapter-11-bankruptcy-protection [https://perma.cc/V6WS-B7LC].
265. Ivan Penn, PG&E, Troubled California Utility, Emerges From Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES
(Jul.
28,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/01/business/energy-environment/pgebankruptcy-ends.html [https://perma.cc/2ULQ-5AYQ]; Michael Liedtke, PG&E to Ante Up $150M
for
Botched
Outages,
Recent
Wildfires, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(May
26,
2021),
https://apnews.com/article/environment-and-nature-government-and-politics-business2ef8a7bb65b1f7a896bedde4b18c3192 [https://perma.cc/N76S-ZF5V].
266. Aaron Williams, Timothy Bella & María Lusa Paúl, Judge Orders Utility PG&E to
Explain Role in Start of Dixie Fire That’s Tearing Through California, WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/08/07/dixie-fire-california-missingpeople/ [https://perma.cc/CYZ9-MNNZ]; Colby Bremel, Dixie Fire Becomes Largest Single Wildfire
(Aug.
6,
2021),
in
California
History,
POLITICO
https://www.politico.com/states/california/story/2021/08/06/dixie-fire-becomes-largest-singlewildfire-in-california-history-1389651 [https://perma.cc/D33B-3VCE].
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b. Energy Sovereignty for Indian Tribes
Finally, a growing number of Indian tribes have embraced many
of the principles of energy democracy under the umbrella of “energy
sovereignty.” 267 For many Indian tribes, the push to create a full tribal
utility or invest in smaller, tribally owned energy projects has arisen
from a desire to increase self-determination and improve economic
conditions. Despite the substantial energy resources present on tribal
lands 268 and some support from the federal government for energy
development, 269 Indian households face disproportionate energy
insecurity. 270 The geographic characteristics of reservations—rural,
dispersed, sometimes with challenging terrain—make them more
expensive to serve than concentrated population centers; historically,
this has meant investor-owned utilities were unwilling to expand
267. The Energy Sovereignty Institute explains:
Energy sovereignty applies the concepts of tribal sovereignty to energy resources and
uses. It is “. . . the right of conscious individuals, communities and peoples to make their
own decisions on energy generation, distribution and consumption in a way that is
appropriate within their ecological, social, economic and cultural circumstances . . . .”
About,
ENERGY
SOVEREIGNTY
INST.,
https://energysovereigntyinstitute.org/the-energysovereignty-institute/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2021) [https://perma.cc/PR82-V2BN].
268. Tribal lands contain 5% of the total U.S. renewable generation potential. Developing
Clean Energy Projects on Tribal Lands: Data and Resources for Tribes, OFF. OF INDIAN ENERGY,
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY
3 (Apr.
2013),
https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy13osti/57748.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y4QV-F3DP]; see also About Natural Resources Revenue Data, OFF. OF NAT. RES.
REVENUE DATA, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, https://revenuedata.doi.gov/ (last visited Oct. 3,
2021) [https://perma.cc/UL8B-5FGN] (documenting revenue paid to tribes from energy and
mineral extraction on reservations); ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ENERGY
CONSUMPTION AND RENEWABLE DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL ON INDIAN LANDS 23–26 (Apr. 2000),
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/06/f34/EIA2000.pdf [https://perma.cc/M354-DFCV]
(identifying renewable resources on reservations).
269. The Office of Indian Energy, within the U.S. Department of Energy, is authorized to
provide financial assistance to tribal governments for energy efficiency and renewable energy
projects. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, §§ 2603, 2606, 106 Stat. 2776, 3114–3115,
3118 (codified at scattered sections of 16 and 42 U.S.C.); DOE Announces $15 Million to Deploy
Energy Infrastructure on Tribal Lands, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (Nov. 13, 2019),
https://www.energy.gov/articles/doe-announces-15-million-deploy-energy-infrastructure-triballands [https://perma.cc/THD9-XRRX]; U.S. Department of Energy Awards $12 Million to American
Indian and Alaska Native Communities to Maximize Deployment of Energy Technology, U.S. DEP’T
OF ENERGY (July 13, 2021), https://www.energy.gov/indianenergy/articles/us-department-energyawards-12-million-american-indian-and-alaska-native [https://perma.cc/L2XK-XSFL].
The Department of the Interior also has a grant program for tribal energy development. See
17 Tribes Awarded Federal Grants to Support Energy Sovereignty, TRIBAL BUS. NEWS (Dec. 9,
2020), https://tribalbusinessnews.com/sections/energy/13265-17-tribes-awarded-federal-grants-tosupport-energy-sovereignty [https://perma.cc/KDT3-QM7L]; Department of Interior Seeks
Applications for Tribal Energy Capacity-Building Grants, TRIBAL BUS. NEWS (June 15, 2020),
https://nativenewsonline.net/business/department-of-interior-seek-applications-for-tribal-energycapacity-building-grants [https://perma.cc/HT8Y-45HV].
270. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 268, at ix (noting “14.2 percent of Indian
households on reservations had no access to electricity, as compared to only 1.4 percent of all U.S.
households”).
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service to such areas to serve remote customers. 271 The Navajo Tribal
Utility Authority, for example, was formed in 1959 specifically to
address the absence of investor-owned utilities in the twenty-seven
thousand square-mile Navajo Nation, and is now the largest multiutility enterprise owned and operated by an Indian tribe. 272 Routine
mismanagement by the federal government of tribal resources 273 and
investor-owned utility dismissiveness of tribal customers’ concerns 274
give Indian tribes additional reasons to form a tribal utility. 275
Creation of a tribal utility, then, provides the opportunity to
escape the “federal paternalism permeat[ing] all Indian energy
development.” 276 Even a single project can allow a tribe a greater degree
of control over its energy security. Indeed, Tribal Council Chair Darrell
Seki of the Red Lake Nation in northern Minnesota described the
Tribe’s growing number of solar arrays as setting the Tribe on a path to
a future where “members receive free energy and the danger of being
disconnected no longer exists.” 277 As a result of the project, tribal

271. RENEWABLE RES. PROGRAM, supra note 39, at 6 (“For many years, most homes did not
have electricity service as a result of both the vast distances between homes and the poverty status
of the reservations. While most reservations had some type of electric service, it was often limited
to larger towns and villages.”).
272. NAVAJO TRIBAL UTIL. AUTH., https://www.ntua.com/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/2N62-ZM9V]. The Navajo Tribal Utility Authority sees its mandate as more than
just providing utility service: it aims to “promote employment opportunities on the Navajo Nation,
and to improve the health and welfare of the residents of the Navajo Nation while improving the
standard of life.” Id.
273. See, e.g., Patrick Reis, Obama Admin Strikes $3.4B Deal in Indian Trust Lawsuit, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 8, 2009), https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/12/08/08greenwi
re-obama-admin-strikes-34b-deal-in-indian-trust-l-92369.html
[https://perma.cc/5XM7-H8RT]
(discussing historic settlement for Department of Interior mismanagement of tribal land trust
accounts); Felicia Fonseca, Navajo to Get $554 Million in Settlement with US, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Sept. 25, 2014), https://apnews.com/article/cd9ef2efd2dd4ff1b1290a88a6b36bef [https://perma.cc/
TYT4-GG9N] (describing the federal government’s mismanaged extraction of natural resources on
Navajo land as well as its failure to appropriately invest revenue from these contracts); see also
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-502, INDIAN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT: POOR
MANAGEMENT BY BIA HAS HINDERED ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ON INDIAN LANDS 1 (2015),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-15-502.pdf [https://perma.cc/DA9Z-M74U] (documenting how
shortcomings of the Bureau of Indian Affairs resulted in missed development opportunities, lost
revenue, and jeopardized projects).
274. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 268, at 3–5.
275. See Nicholas M. Ravotti, Access to Energy in Indian Country: The Difficulties of SelfDetermination in Renewable Energy Development, 41 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 279 (2017) (describing
the legal basis for the formation of a tribal utility and the complex jurisdictional issues governing
tribal energy development).
276. Id. at 308.
277. Frank Jossi, Red Lake Nation Uses Crowdfunding to Bet Big on Solar Energy,
USNews.com (Nov. 21, 2020), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/minnesota/articles/202011-21/red-lake-nation-uses-crowdfunding-to-bet-big-on-solar-energy
[https://perma.cc/4PEL6494].
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member Bob Blake created a new solar installation company to train
tribal members for future projects. 278
Any funds received from electricity payments remain within the
community, meaning tribal utilities capture economic benefits for their
reservation which would otherwise be funneled to an outside entity. 279
Tribal utilities can implement workforce development programs to
create new jobs for their members 280 and ensure business decisions are
aligned with the political, social, and cultural priorities of the tribe. 281
Given the high proportion of Native Americans living below the poverty
line, these opportunities can meaningfully improve the quality of life on
a reservation. 282 Thus, in addition to increased political sovereignty
from recapturing decisionmaking authority, the creation of a tribal
utility can increase the economic sovereignty and self-sufficiency of the
community.
C. Municipalization Limits and Opportunities
It is important to stress that municipalization may not be the
silver bullet that vaults communities’ goals from desirable to
achievable. Regarding renewable energy goals, municipal utilities may
still rely heavily on electricity generated by fossil fuel resources,
although they often have the ability to pivot away from them more
quickly than investor-owned utilities that must be responsive to the
demands of public utility commissions and corporate shareholders. For
instance, Nebraska, the only state where all customers are served by
public power utilities, 283 still relies on coal for more than half of its
278. Kelsey Misbrener, IPS Solar Empowers Minnesota Tribe to Take Control of Their Energy
and Save Their Lake, SOLAR POWER WORLD (July 21, 2021), https://www.solarpowerworldonline.
com/2021/07/ips-solar-empowers-minnesota-tribe-take-control-of-energy-save-lake/
[https://perma.cc/JG4H-35MU].
279. Pilar M. Thomas, Tribal Utility Development: Energy Development and Services on Tribal
Land,
ARIZ. ATT’Y 26 (Apr. 2019), https://www.azattorneymagdigital.com/azattorneymag/201904/MobilePagedArticle.action?articleId=1476899#articleId14768
99 [https://perma.cc/2Y8T-SMPJ].
280. Id.; RENEWABLE RES. PROGRAM, supra note 39, at 36 (asserting “unemployment has
decreased from 80 percent to 34 percent” in the Fort Mojave Tribe partially due to the creation of
the Aha Macav Power Service).
281. RENEWABLE RES. PROGRAM, supra note 39, at 32 (describing Tribal Council oversight of
the Aha Macav Power Service).
282. The poverty rate among Native Americans, the highest among any race group, is almost
double that of the nation as a whole: 26.2% compared to 14%. See American Indian and Alaska
Native Heritage Month: November 2017, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Oct. 2017),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/newsroom/facts-for-features/2017/cb17-ff20.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9MEC-R4PW] (“The median household income of single-race American Indian
and Alaska Native households in 2016 [is $39,719]. This compares with $57,617 for the nation as
a whole.”).
283. See supra notes 200–201 and accompanying text (discussing public power in Nebraska).
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electricity generation, but in 2021 became the first Republican state to
embrace decarbonization when all three of the largest publicly owned
utilities in the state voted to set goals of net-zero electricity by 2050. 284
Furthermore, as Shelley Welton has noted, one community’s decision to
purchase more renewable energy to reduce its carbon emissions may
merely displace them onto another community. 285
Contrary to the goals of energy democracy activists,
municipalization may undermine equity insofar as high costs make it
difficult to achieve for any but the most affluent communities. 286 When
wealthier, larger customers break away from their investor-owned
utility, rural and poorer ratepayers in neighboring communities can
bear a greater cost burden for grid maintenance. 287 In their haste to
decarbonize, municipal utilities may perpetuate environmental racism
by siting renewable energy facilities in communities of color where they
are not wanted. 288
Like their private counterparts, municipal and tribal utilities
can also fall prey to mismanagement. The capital-intensive nature of
the electric industry means any electric utility involved in
infrastructure development (building transmission or generation) is
vulnerable to construction delays, cost overruns, and lackluster
performance results. 289 These factors, as well as mundane afflictions

284. Nebraska: State Profile and Energy Estimates, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/state/?sid=NE (last visited Oct. 3, 2021) [https://perma.cc/394M-Z999] (55% of
electric generation from coal in 2019); Adam Aton, Neb. Decarbonization Vote Was Years in the
NEWS:
CLIMATEWIRE
(Dec.
10,
2021),
Making,
E&E
https://subscriber.politicopro.com/article/eenews/2021/12/10/neb-decarbonization-vote-was-yearsin-the-making-284154?source=email [https://perma.cc/S&MV-3B87] (reporting on decarbonization
commitments made by elected officials at Nebraska Public Power District, Omaha Public Power
District, and Lincoln Electric System which, together, provide electricity to almost the entire
state).
285. Welton, supra note 35, at 641 (noting the “limited impact on the composition of the larger
grid” of a single community’s energy choices).
286. Casey Demoss, Opinion, Changing a Utility’s Owner Won’t Put Out the Fire, HILL (Nov.
11, 2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/469853-changing-a-utilitys-ownerwont-put-out-the-fire [https://perma.cc/8U7V-WH3V].
287. Id.
288. See, e.g., Kristi E. Swartz, Fla. Solar Plans Stoke Fight Over ‘Environmental Racism,’
E&E
NEWS
(June
3,
2021),
https://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1063733977
[https://perma.cc/LH9G-U2Q7].
289. See, e.g., DAVID SCHLISSEL, INST. FOR ENERGY ECON. & FIN. ANALYSIS, LONG-TERM
POWER PLANT CONTRACTS SADDLE AMP COMMUNITIES WITH HIGH ELECTRICITY PRICES (Sept.
2020),
https://ieefa.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/AMP-Communities-Saddled-With-HighElectricity-Prices_September-2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DW62-9PKK]
(documenting
how
municipal utility customers in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, Virginia, and West Virginia overpaid
for wholesale electricity because of poor decisions by their power purchasing agency, American
Municipal Power).
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like organizational dysfunction and aging facilities, mean public power
may not always present a low-cost alternative for communities. 290
Nevertheless, as President Roosevelt suggested as far back as
the 1930s, cities can use their power to leave the investor-owned utility
to obtain significant concessions during the franchise renegotiation
period. The example of Boulder’s efforts, described above, is a case in
point, with Xcel taking significant steps to decarbonize its operations
nationwide and address other demands by the city. 291
Opportunities to partner with a willing investor-owned utility or
develop smaller-scale projects can provide a community an alternative
path to achieving their policy goals, forestalling the need to create a
utility. For example, Red Lake Nation in Minnesota developed a small,
crowdfunded solar array it will fully own while simultaneously
partnering with Allete—the parent company of nearby investor-owned
utility Minnesota Power—to build a utility-scale solar installation. 292
The partnership arose after Minnesota Power demonstrated its good
will toward the tribe by engaging in outreach and consultation as it
planned a transmission project near the Red Lake reservation. 293 Tribal
leaders have stated that these solar projects will fulfill the Red Lake
Nation’s economic and environmental objectives without the financial
risk and red tape of establishing a full-fledged utility. 294 And the city of
St. Louis, Missouri, has partnered with its utility Ameren and local
nonprofits to increase access to electric vehicles in low-income
neighborhoods and communities of color. 295 The new charging stations
290. See City Council Launches Cleveland Public Power Hearings, WOSU PUB. MEDIA (Aug.
31,
2020),
https://www.ideastream.org/news/city-council-launches-cleveland-public-powerhearings [https://perma.cc/NS58-TN5A]; Ron Regan, Cleveland Public Power Lacks Transparency
in Outage Reports, ABC NEWS (Mar. 30, 2021), https://www.news5cleveland.com/news/localnews/investigations/cleveland-public-power-lacks-transparency-in-outage-reports
[https://perma.cc/HD2U-M3JV]; Press Release, U.S. Att’ys Off. for the Dist. of Colo., U.S. Dep’t of
Just., Six More Defendants Sentenced for Embezzlement from the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe (Apr.
10, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-co/pr/six-more-defendants-sentenced-embezzlement-utemountain-ute-tribe [https://perma.cc/2SY9-LNNJ] (describing fraud and embezzlement charges
within tribal utility).
291. See supra notes 247–249 and accompanying text (discussing Xcel decarbonization efforts).
292. Jossi, supra note 39.
293. Id.; Minnesota Power Energizes Great Northern Transmission Line to Move Company
Closer
to
50
Percent Renewable Energy by 2021, BUS. WIRE (June 11, 2020),
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20200611005106/en/Minnesota-Power-EnergizesGreat-Northern-Transmission-Line-to-Move-Company-Closer-to-50-Percent-Renewable-Energyby-2021 [https://perma.cc/GEF3-E44Q] (describing seventy-five voluntary meetings and outreach
forums held by Minnesota Power during transmission route planning process).
294. Jossi, supra note 39 (describing the projects’ twin purposes of hiring local workers and
protecting the earth).
295. Susan Cosier, The Electric Car Revolution Shouldn’t Leave Anyone Behind, NAT. RES.
DEF.
COUNCIL (May 27, 2021), https://www.nrdc.org/stories/electric-car-revolution-shouldntleave-anyone-behind [https://perma.cc/X9SS-HRXW].
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and car-share program will help the nonprofits serve their elderly and
disabled clients while making electric car use convenient for other
residents. 296
In 2021, Ann Arbor, Michigan, released a report advocating for
the creation of a municipally owned “sustainable energy utility”
(“SEU”). 297 The SEU would operate as a parallel energy service to Ann
Arbor’s current electricity provider, DTE Energy (“DTE”), and focus
exclusively on localized strategies to help Ann Arbor meet its goal of
carbon neutrality by 2030. 298 City leaders observed the growing
community momentum around the creation of a traditional municipal
utility, yet desired to avoid costly acquisition of DTE’s aging
infrastructure and the possibility of lengthy litigation. 299 Ann Arbor for
Public Power, a local municipalization activist group, reacted to the
proposal with support for the city’s “innovative and constructive”
concept while maintaining a traditional municipal utility would provide
greater benefits. 300 The SEU report was fast-tracked for release 301 in
anticipation of an impending decision by Ann Arbor’s Energy
Commission on the pursuit of a feasibility study, the next step towards
the creation of a traditional municipal utility. 302 Voters may have their
choice of an SEU or a traditional municipal utility on the ballot in
2022. 303 Either way, the SEU proposal demonstrates another way local
governments can nimbly and creatively respond to challenges in
electricity provision under current municipalization laws.
Thus, whether or not a local government or Indian tribe actually
creates a municipal utility, the authority to do so is an important facet
296. Id.
297. CITY OF ANN ARBOR, ANN ARBOR’S SUSTAINABLE ENERGY UTILITY (Oct. 2021),
https://www.a2gov.org/departments/sustainability/SustainabilityMe/Documents/A2_Sustainable_Energy_Report_2021_v7.pdf [https://perma.cc/NP2D-CBAF].
298. Id. at 4, 10. These strategies include energy efficiency programs, installation of microgrids
between neighboring households, on-bill financing, district geothermal systems, community solar
programs, and programs specifically for low-income and underserved residents. Id. at 11.
299. Id. at 5 (“Every dollar we don’t spend in litigation or to buy [infrastructure] . . . [is a]
dollar[ ] we can use to immediately provide reliable, clean, and affordable public power to
everyone.”). See also Jeffrey Tomich, Mich. City Offers New Model for 100% Clean Power, E&E
NEWS: ENERGYWIRE (Nov. 15, 2021), https://www.eenews.net/articles/mich-city-offers-new-modelfor-100-clean-power/ [https://perma.cc/F3HNQJLX].
300. Ryan Stanton, Ann Arbor’s Latest Idea Doesn’t Offer Clear Path to 100% Renewable
Energy, Group Says, MLIVE, https://www.mlive.com/news/ann-arbor/2021/10/ann-arbors-latestidea-doesnt-offer-clear-path-to-100-renewable-energy-group-says.html (last updated Oct. 18,
2021, 4:15 PM) [https://perma.cc/2BKZ-E3TD].
301. CITY OF ANN ARBOR, supra note 297, at 8.
302. Ryan Stanton, Ann Arbor Voters Could Ultimately Decide on Shift Away from DTE
https://www.mlive.com/news/ann-arbor/2021/09/ann-arbor-voters-couldEnergy,
MLIVE,
ultimately-decide-on-shift-away-from-dte-energy.html (last updated Sept. 8, 2021, 1:48 PM)
[https://perma.cc/E65P-KDCA].
303. Id.
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of local power and self-determination. In other words, local
governments’ power to own, manage, and shape municipal utilities to
serve their citizens provides an opportunity to consider ways in which
local governments can use control over electricity services to achieve a
broad range of economic, social, and environmental protection goals free
from state interference. Part III turns to that issue.
III. LOCAL POWER III: IMPLICATIONS AND INTERSECTIONS
Part III returns to the distinct but complementary meanings of
“local power.” It considers the extent to which the assertion of local
control over electric power delivery can enhance local authority and
capacity more broadly. It illustrates in more detail how local
communities’ exercise of control over electric power resources and
delivery can create an important safe harbor from the increased state
preemption of local regulatory authority in other contexts, without
many of the parochialism-related drawbacks of localism. Section A
evaluates local government policies and goals regarding energy both
when local governments act in a regulatory capacity and when they act
in a proprietary capacity as a municipal utility. These policies include
not only aggressive decarbonization policies for the energy sector but
also programs to enhance energy services and economic benefits for
minority and low-income communities. Section B reconsiders the
debates over localism and parochialism in the context of local energy
projects and systems. It suggests that one way to address the “not in
my backyard” or “NIMBY” tendencies of local governments is to
enhance the ability of the community in question to take ownership of
the projects themselves, either through a municipal utility or in
partnership with the incumbent investor-owned utility.
A. Local Energy Policies: Decarbonization, Distributed Energy, and
Energy Justice
Recent years have seen a noticeable increase in local
government action to address climate change, both in response to lack
of Congressional leadership on the issue and four years of Trump
Administration efforts to reverse progress made during the Obama
Administration. 304 With U.S. cities emitting more carbon per capita
304. See, e.g., Nadja Popovich, Livia Albeck-Ripka & Kendra Pierre-Louis, The Trump
Administration is Reversing 100 Environmental Rules. Here’s the Full List., N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/climate/trump-environment-rollbacks-list.html
(last
updated Jan. 20, 2021) [https://perma.cc/6ZJ8-CDUN]; Sara Fox, Localizing Environmental
Federalism, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 149–51 (2020) (discussing efforts by local governments to
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than their global peers, policy choices at the local level stand to have an
outsize impact on slowing climate change. 305 While local government
action alone will not solve the global climate crisis, such action can
create pressure on both state and federal government actors. Further,
local government action builds broad-based political support, as
evidenced by the Sunrise Movement, faith groups focused on climate
change, and growing focus on the Green New Deal and similar largescale energy transition platforms. 306 Importantly, many of these local
policies are explicitly guided by principles of “energy justice”—seeking
a “just transition” to repair historic energy disparities and prevent their
further exacerbation as the nation decarbonizes the energy sector. 307
enact climate policies “in response both to the local reality of environmental problems, as well as
the political reality of federal and state retreat”).
President Biden has expressed his intent to focus on climate change, and in particular
environmental justice; he has introduced several policy initiatives aimed at reducing emissions
and installed a cadre of officials with environmental justice backgrounds, including Shalanda
Baker as Deputy Director for Energy Justice in the Department of Energy. See Exec. Order No.
14,008, Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad, 86 C.F.R. 7619 (Jan. 27, 2021); Exec.
Order No. 14,007, Establishing President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, 86 Fed.
Reg. 7615 (Jan. 27, 2021); Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: The American Jobs Plan
(Mar. 31, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/31/factsheet-the-american-jobs-plan/ [https://perma.cc/XR7C-BMAC]; Press Release, The White House,
Fact Sheet: Biden Administration Advances Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure (Apr. 22,
2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/22/fact-sheetbiden-administration-advances-electric-vehicle-charging-infrastructure/ [https://perma.cc/A7N9LZUT]; Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: President Biden Sets 2030 Greenhouse Gas
Pollution Reduction Target Aimed at Creating Good-Paying Union Jobs and Securing U.S.
Leadership on Clean Energy Technologies (Apr. 22, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/statements-releases/2021/04/22/fact-sheet-president-biden-sets-2030-greenhouse-gaspollution-reduction-target-aimed-at-creating-good-paying-union-jobs-and-securing-u-sleadership-on-clean-energy-technologies/ [https://perma.cc/NC7Z-Y6AT]; President’s FY 2022
Budget Advances Equity Across Government, OFF. OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE
PRESIDENT
(2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/FY22-BudgetEquity-Fact-Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9QF-N52Y]; Jeff Brady, ‘Energy Justice’ Nominee Brings
Activist Voice to Climate Plans, NPR, https://www.npr.org/2021/06/08/1004059950/energy-justicenominee-brings-activist-voice-to-bidens-climate-plans (last updated June 8, 2021, 11:50 AM)
[https://perma.cc/8CWN-JTTA]. Even if successful, however, the viability of President Biden’s
proposals is uncertain, and they are unlikely to bear fruit for several years.
305. See Shreyas Vangala, Ellery Tomaszkiewicz & Joe Brady, Making Climate Change Local:
Municipalities and Communities Key to Decarbonization, 37 CLIMATE & ENERGY 1, 4 (2021) (citing
data showing seventy-two of the top five hundred cities with the highest carbon emissions are in
the United States and highlighting local government climate action plans).
306. See, e.g., Juana Summers, Progressives Gear Up for Broad New Push on Climate Action,
NPR (Jan. 13, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/01/13/956192132/progressives-gear-upfor-broad-new-push-on-climate-action [https://perma.cc/QZ99-LM5Y]; see also Katherine A.
Trisolini, All Hands on Deck: Local Governments and the Potential for Bidirectional Climate
Change Regulation, 62 STAN. L. REV. 669, 672–78 (2010) (discussing limits and potential of local
government action on climate change).
307. “Energy justice” is distinct from energy democracy in expressing the idea that “all
individuals should have access to energy that is affordable, safe, sustainable and able to sustain a
decent lifestyle, as well as the opportunity to participate in and lead energy decision-making
processes with the authority to make change.” Sanya Carley & David M. Konisky, The Justice and
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Katrina Wyman and Danielle Spiegel-Feld have attributed the
expansion of environmental policymaking at the local level, at least in
large urban centers, to three central factors—a perceived link between
environmental protection and economic growth, more resources to hire
environmental policy experts, and the concentration of liberal partisans
in cities. 308 But it is not only the handful of large, Democratic-leaning
metropolises in the United States that are choosing to act. Since 1991,
over six hundred local governments in the United States have adopted
some form of climate action plan that includes an emissions reduction
target. 309 For more than 170 jurisdictions, these targets involve a
transformative commitment to powering their community with 100%
renewable electricity. 310 The deadlines to complete this transformation
vary, from the relatively modest (e.g., 2050) to the more ambitious (e.g.,
2030), and so do the rigor and detail of the plans accompanying these
pledges. 311 In addition to addressing the source of their electricity, local
governments are deploying similar strategies to make progress on
emissions reduction outside the electricity sector, including investing in
alternative transportation infrastructure, updating building codes, and

Equity Implications of the Clean Energy Transition, 5 NATURE ENERGY 569, 570 (2020). A just
transition “establishes the importance of equity and justice in the planning, implementation, and
assessment of every socio-energy system change that shapes the energy transition.” Id. Several
notable negative impacts are associated with the transition to renewable energy—job loss, wider
economic depression in areas of former fossil-fuel industry, a sense of cultural displacement, and
greater energy insecurity. For a discussion of these impacts, see id.
308. Wyman & Spiegel-Feld, supra note 10, at 328–33.
309. SAM MARKOLF, INÊS M.L. AZEVEDO, MARK MURO & DAVID G. VICTOR, BROOKINGS,
PLEDGES AND PROMISES: STEPS TOWARD GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS IN THE
LARGEST
CITIES
ACROSS
THE
UNITED
STATES
1
(Oct.
2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/pledges-and-progress-steps-toward-greenhouse-gasemissions-reductions-in-the-100-largest-cities-across-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/3ZQ36DN4]; see also About the Network: Who We Are, CLIMATE MAYORS, https://climatemayors.org/whowe-are/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2021) [https://perma.cc/E2LM-HKPC] (“Climate Mayors, founded in
2014, is a bipartisan, peer-to-peer network of more than 470 U.S. mayors demonstrating climate
leadership through meaningful actions in their communities.”).
310. Committed, SIERRA CLUB, https://www.sierraclub.org/ready-for-100/commitments (last
visited Sept. 10, 2021) [https://perma.cc/AK2Q-CMH3].
311. See id.; see also, e.g., Salt Lake City, Utah, Joint Resolution of the Salt Lake City Council
and Mayor Establishing a Community Renewable Energy Goal for Salt Lake City (Aug. 27, 2019),
http://www.slcdocs.com/slcgreen/SLC-2030.pdf [https://perma.cc/246R-N3SJ] (committing Salt
Lake City to 100% renewable energy by 2030); CITY OF BOS., CLIMATE ACTION PLAN: 2019 UPDATE
5
(Oct.
2019),
https://www.boston.gov/sites/default/files/imce-uploads/201910/city_of_boston_2019_climate_action_plan_update_2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ANG3-VHF2]
(describing Boston’s goal of carbon neutrality by 2050); Emma Penrod, Following Google’s
Footsteps, Des Moines Pledges 24/7 Clean Electricity by 2035, UTIL. DIVE (Jan. 15, 2021),
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/following-googles-footsteps-des-moines-pledges-247-cleanelectricity-by/593456/ [https://perma.cc/V9X4-RVV7] (reporting on unanimous resolution of Des
Moines City Council to establish the first local government 24/7 clean energy goal).
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overhauling zoning strategy. 312 Through careful attention to where and
how these programs are implemented, local governments have
intentionally embedded economic and racial justice principles into their
climate action plans. 313
Local governments with an existing municipal utility (or
considering the feasibility of creating one) have an even greater
capacity to address energy justice imperatives. Without a specific focus
on the energy justice implications of new projects, energy programs
intended to improve the social welfare of the community as a whole may
fall short of their potential, or, worse yet, may merely pay lip service to
these values.
Take the rise of distributed solar resources, for example. At first
glance, rooftop solar seems to align with principles of energy justice:
more renewable energy on the grid, democratization of energy through
dispersal of ownership, greater community engagement in energy
decisionmaking, and reduced costs for ratepayers through
compensation for the energy generated. However, rooftop solar in most
communities tends to be installed by affluent, white households; as
such, some investor-owned utilities “deftly used the poor as scapegoats”
to argue against the further proliferation of rooftop solar. 314 At the same
time, other investor-owned utilities have proposed “community energy”
programs using utility-scale solar arrays, touted as a way to increase
generation opportunities for low-income ratepayers. 315 Shalanda Baker
has argued, however, that these programs do little to advance local
control or energy justice objectives since they “replicate an approach to
scale and siting that maintains the paradigm of utility-oriented energy
development.” 316 Without a true community ownership model that

312. See, e.g., Vangala et al., supra note 305, at 6–10 (discussing initiatives in New York City,
Chicago, Los Angeles, Honolulu, Charlotte, and Denver).
313. See Jesse Klein, 8 Cities Share How Racial Justice is Embedded into Their Climate Plans,
GREENBIZ (July 20, 2020), https://www.greenbiz.com/article/8-cities-share-how-racial-justiceembedded-their-climate-plans [https://perma.cc/JU56-3SG2].
314. Shalanda Baker, Unlocking the Energy Commons, in LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY FOR A
NEW AGE 211, 215 (Melissa Scanlan ed., 2017); see also Shalanda Baker, Anti-Resilience: A
Roadmap for Transformational Justice Within the Energy System, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1,
29 (2019); Deepa Shivaram, Shalanda Baker and the Energy Crisis Plaguing Black and Brown
Americans, NBC NEWS (Mar. 9, 2021), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/shalanda-bakerenergy-crisis-plaguing-black-brown-americans-n1260047 [https://perma.cc/R6QG-8FSX]; Tom
Perkins, Is It Community Solar If the Utility – Not Community – Owns the Panels?, ENERGY NEWS
NETWORK (June 29, 2021), https://energynews.us/2021/06/29/is-it-community-solar-if-the-utilitynot-community-owns-the-panels/ [https://perma.cc/9E27-JK4H].
315. Baker, Unlocking the Energy Commons, supra note 314, at 216.
316. Id. at 223; see also Andrew Hazzard, Minnesota’s Community Solar Program Leads the
Nation. Poorer People, Often Residents of Color, Are Left in the Shade., SAHAN J. (Apr. 1, 2021),
https://sahanjournal.com/climate/community-solar-minnesota/
[https://perma.cc/GLF5-7EM7]
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incorporates the input of the historically excluded, simply switching to
renewable sources does not mitigate investor-owned utility reliance on
“extraction, exploitation, and getting [projects] done for the lowest
cost.” 317
By contrast, local governments with a municipal utility can
ensure any purported benefits of an energy program are actually
captured by their community. The municipal utility of Waverly, Iowa,
offers energy efficiency rebates paid in gift certificates which can be
used anywhere in the town, thus fostering entirely local economic
development. 318 In 2011, Los Angeles’ municipal utility created the
Utility Pre-Craft Trainee Program to develop a workforce capable of
implementing its renewable energy initiatives. 319 A five-year
benchmark of the program found its trainees are racially and ethnically
diverse, are proportionately more female than workers in similar
industries, and come from low-income neighborhoods with high
unemployment rates. 320 The program thus embodies a just transition
by prioritizing underserved community members for the stable jobs
created by clean energy integration.
Returning to distributed energy resources, multiple tribal
utilities have instituted renewable energy development mechanisms to
address energy poverty and access on their reservations. 321 The Navajo
Tribal Utility Authority rents out renewable generation units to tribal
members located in non-grid areas. 322 In 2014, the Moapa Band of
Paiutes Tribe created a microgrid for its business district powered by a
hybrid solar generator, reducing reliance on diesel generation and
saving the tribe an estimated $700,000 a year. 323 As “Indian-driven
(describing limited access to community solar among low-income households and communities of
color in Minnesota).
317. Tara Lohan, Justice First: How to Make the Clean Energy Transition Equitable,
REVELATOR
(Jan.
11,
2021),
https://therevelator.org/energy-justice-baker/
[https://perma.cc/2MWN-M3UY] (detailing an interview with Shalanda Baker).
318. AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, Public Power for Your Community, supra note 30, at 25; Energy
Efficiency Rebates, WAVERLY UTILS., http://www.waverlyutilities.com/electric/residential/rebates/
(last visited Sept. 11, 2021) [https://perma.cc/TFE3-GDMF].
319. AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, Public Power for Your Community, supra note 30, at 16; MEGAN
EMIKO SCOTT & CAROL ZABIN, U.C. BERKELEY LAB. CTR., TRAINING FOR THE FUTURE II: LOS
ANGELES’S
UTILITY
PRE-CRAFT
TRAINEE
PROGRAM
5
(2016),
https://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/pdf/2016/Training-for-the-Future-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9HWFJ5Z].
320. SCOTT & ZABIN, supra note 319, at 3.
321. Ravotti, supra note 275, at 314–17.
322. Id. at 314.
323. Id. at 315; Barry Cassell, New Solar Project Completed at Moapa Tribal Facility in
Nevada,
TRANSMISSION
HUB
(Apr.
9,
2014),
https://www.transmissionhub.com/articles/2014/04/new-solar-project-completed-at-moapa-tribalfacility-in-nevada.html [https://perma.cc/W2S5-T39L].
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solutions to Indian problems,” these projects directly respond to the
needs of the community free from investor-owned utility diversion of
benefits. 324
Municipal utilities can partner with other entities in their
community to pioneer equity initiatives that would be outside the
purview of a traditional investor-owned utility. In 2020, in response to
the COVID-19 pandemic’s unequal impact on lower-income school
children, 325 Chattanooga, Tennessee’s, Electric Power Board announced
a first-of-its-kind project giving free internet access and hardware to
homes with school children on free or reduced lunch programs. 326 This
program illustrates municipal utilities’ ability to quickly respond to
newly identified disparities. 327
Finally, local governments can raise the possibility of
municipalization to inscribe energy justice into their franchise renewal
agreements. When Minneapolis renewed its franchise agreement with
Xcel Energy after threatening municipalization, 328 it required the
investor-owned utility to form a joint Minneapolis Clean Energy
Partnership to ensure progress towards an energy system which
“sustains the city’s economy and environment and contributes to a more
socially just community.” 329 Salt Lake City, Utah, and Boulder,
Colorado, formed similar partnerships with their investor-owned
324. Ravotti, supra note 275, at 317. In another example of a tribal utility creatively
responding to the challenge of energy access, in 2021 the Navajo Tribal Utility Authority formed
a unique partnership with Los Angeles’ municipal utility to extend powerlines to remote
communities in the Navajo Nation. Partnership Extends Powerlines to Navajo Nation Homes,
PRESS
(Dec.
10,
2021),
https://apnews.com/article/businessASSOCIATED
44affb0a9b1382ab15fa251be733316f [https://perma.cc/L6EW-UBX4]. The exchange allows the Los
Angeles Department of Water and Power to train its work crews in powerline installation in rural,
rugged terrain. Id. The partnership demonstrates the type of innovative cooperation municipal
utilities have the freedom to pursue absent the strictures of PUC regulation.
325. See, e.g., Victoria Collis & Emiliana Vegas, Unequally Disconnected: Access to Online
Learning in the US, BROOKINGS: EDUC. PLUS DEV. BLOG (June 22, 2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/education-plus-development/2020/06/22/unequally-disconnectedaccess-to-online-learning-in-the-us/ [https://perma.cc/5ANT-U7SN].
326. See Ry Marcatillio-McCracken, Chattanooga Uses Municipal Network to Give Students
(July
30,
2020),
Free
Internet
Connections,
INST. FOR LOC. SELF-RELIANCE
https://ilsr.org/chattanooga-uses-municipal-network-to-give-student-free-internet-connections/
[https://perma.cc/5NUZ-FSH4].
327. FAQ: What is HCS EdConnect?, HCS EDCONNECT, https://www.edconnect.org/faq/ (last
updated Mar. 23, 2021) [https://perma.cc/2Y76-Z949] (“This program helps ensure no child is left
behind as schools continue to provide online learning as we deal with the effects of the COVID
crisis.”).
CLEAN
ENERGY
P’SHIP,
328. About
the
Partnership,
MINNEAPOLIS
https://mplscleanenergypartnership.org/about/
(last
visited
Aug.
29,
2021)
[https://perma.cc/3GHU-Z3ZC].
329. MINNEAPOLIS CLEAN ENERGY P’SHIP, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (Aug. 2019),
https://mplscleanenergypartnership.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/2019-CEP-AnnualReport_FINAL-DRAFT.pdf [https://perma.cc/WB3R-9UGF] (internal quotation marks omitted).
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utilities as a condition of signing new franchise agreements. 330 In 2020,
the San Diego City Council granted San Diego Gas & Electric a
temporary six-month extension of its franchise agreement, aiming to
pressure it into including provisions that address the city’s climate
goals while “provid[ing] equitable access to environmental benefits” for
all members of the community. 331 During the extension, San Diego
solicited franchise agreement bids from other utilities in an effort to
stimulate competition. 332 While San Diego Gas & Electric was the only
company to submit an offer, the franchise agreement approved by the
city council in June 2021 includes $20 million to achieve San Diego’s
climate equity goals and an additional $10 million for renewable energy
programs in underserved communities. 333 Neither of these
contributions from San Diego Gas & Electric will come from ratepayer
funds, and a new citizen-focused Franchise Compliance Review
Committee will ensure oversight by the public. 334 And as discussed in

330. See Clean Energy Implementation Plan, ROCKY MOUNTAIN POWER & SALT LAKE CITY
CORP.
2
(Mar.
28,
2017),
http://www.slcdocs.com/slcgreen/SLCRMP%202019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5UYT-WFZV];
Xcel
Energy
Partnership,
CITY
OF
BOULDER,
https://bouldercolorado.gov/projects/xcel-energy-partnership (last visited Oct. 3, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/DL3W-RNAN].
331. San Diego City Council Reluctantly Extends SDG&E Franchise Agreements Through
June, KPBS (Dec. 30, 2020, 9:56 AM), https://www.kpbs.org/news/2020/dec/30/city-councilextends-sdge-franchise-agreement-june/ [https://perma.cc/W5WG-A6UK].
332. On 2nd Try, San Diego Gets Only SDG&E Minimum Bid for Franchise Agreement, Times
San Diego (Apr. 16, 2021), https://timesofsandiego.com/politics/2021/04/16/on-2nd-try-san-diegogets-only-sdge-minimum-bid-for-franchise-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/EZX9-JP83].
333. Id.; Rob Nikolewski, San Diego City Council Gives Final Approval on New Electric and
Gas Franchise Agreement with SDG&E, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB. (June 8, 2021),
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/business/energy-green/story/2021-06-08/franchise-votenumber-2 [https://perma.cc/LYS2-UJW3].
334. San Diego City Council Agrees to Franchise Agreements with SDG&E, ABC10 NEWS SAN
DIEGO, https://www.10news.com/news/local-news/san-diego-news/san-diego-city-council-agreesto-franchise-agreements-with-sdg-e (last updated May 25, 2021, 6:50 PM) [https://perma.cc/4B46Q368]; Nikolewski, supra note 333.
The new franchise agreement is not without its detractors. As of August 2021, two lawsuits
had been filed seeking to void the agreement based on alleged violations of the city’s government
transparency laws and its Climate Action Plan. See Rob Nikolewski, Lawsuit Seeks to Overturn
San Diego’s New Electric and Gas Franchise Agreement with SDG&E, LA JOLLA LIGHT (June 18,
2021, 12:38 PM), https://www.lajollalight.com/news/story/2021-06-18/lawsuit-seeks-to-overturnsan-diegos-new-electric-and-gas-franchise-agreement-with-sdg-e
[https://perma.cc/6FWH2WGN]; Ken Stone, City Attorney Zaps Request for Outside Law Firm in SDG&E Franchise
Lawsuits, TIMES SAN DIEGO (July 19, 2021), https://timesofsandiego.com/politics/2021/07/19/cityattorney-zaps-request-for-outside-law-firm-in-sdge-franchise-lawsuits/ [https://perma.cc/D4MHTSCQ]; Rob Nikolewski, San Diego City Attorney Withdraws Law Firm’s $250,000 Contract to Help
Defend New Franchise Deal with SDG&E, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB. (July 20, 2021, 4:01 PM),
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/business/story/2021-07-20/sd-city-attorney-councilwithdraws-250-000-contract-with-law-firm [https://perma.cc/447D-GP98].
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Part II.B, as of 2021, Chicago continued to hold out for a new franchise
agreement with ComEd centered around “Energy and Equity.” 335
It is true that states concerned about municipalization as a
mechanism to bypass state policy prerogatives could enact legislation
preempting the ability of local governments to municipalize entirely, at
least where the right to do so is statutory. However, several factors
make widespread preemption unlikely. First, local governments with
existing municipal utilities span the political spectrum, and the
communities considering municipalization are not a progressive
monolith. Any legislation enacted to preempt municipalization would
inevitably impact the constituents of the majority party. Second, it
would be difficult for legislators concerned about the political blowback
from a blanket preemption law to craft a bill narrow enough to preempt
a single municipality. Third, the economic and social policies pursued
by local governments through municipalization are embedded in the
government’s proprietary, rather than regulatory, powers. Fourth,
municipalities can meet at least some of these goals through the
negotiation process with existing or future investor-owned utilities, a
process outside the purview of the local-state relationship. Last,
legislating and regulating in the energy arena is technical and complex;
the allure of the status quo and legislative inertia should not be
underestimated. Although state governments are certainly becoming
more active in addressing local energy initiatives, 336 even a law signed
in June 2021 by Florida Governor Ron DeSantis restricting local
governments from directing utilities to switch to renewable energy
contained an exemption for municipal utilities. 337
B. Localism Revisited: Overcoming Parochialism in Energy Projects
Through Local Power
Evaluating the dynamics of local utilities and local energy
projects provides a new perspective on the renewed scholarly debates

335. See supra notes 256–261 and accompanying text (discussing Mayor Lori Lightfoot’s
demands for a new franchise agreement).
336. See Liz Crampton, ‘Rogue City Leaders’: How Republicans Are Taking Power Away From
(June
23,
2021,
4:30
AM),
Mayors,
POLITICO
https://www.politico.com/news/2021/06/23/republicans-are-taking-power-away-from-mayors495564 [https://perma.cc/3EAJ-KBHF].
337. Sam Sachs, Local Florida Governments Can’t Restrict ‘Dirty Energy’ Usage Under New
Law Signed by DeSantis, WFLA NEWS CHANNEL 8, https://www.wfla.com/news/florida/localflorida-governments-cant-restrict-dirty-energy-usage-under-new-law-signed-by-desantis/
(last
updated June 22, 2021, 3:30 PM) [https://perma.cc/B6CU-RW26].
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over “localism.” 338 Opponents of localism have often raised the specter
of local governments, notably suburbs, engaging in exclusionary zoning
or otherwise acting contrary to the interest of racial minorities or lowincome residents as reasons to support state oversight and to be
cautious of increased local control. 339 Others counter that today’s
polarized politics and gerrymandering at the state level render state
government more suspect today than in the 1990s, when the original
disputes over localism were last the subject of intense debate. 340 Yet
others focus on the increased ability of racial minorities to have a voice
in policymaking at the local level, creating new arguments in favor of
increased local power when it comes to local-state relations. 341
All these debates, understandably, focus on local governments
acting in their regulatory capacity. They consider the ability of local
governments to engage in zoning; regulate economic activities within
their borders like living wage laws, fair scheduling laws, and
antidiscrimination protections for citizens; or impose environmental
protection provisions on businesses such as regulating plastic waste or
placing conditions on new buildings with regard to use of natural gas or
energy efficiency. 342 As detailed in Part I, while local governments
generally have the authority to engage in such regulation as a matter
of home rule, states can easily displace that authority through expressly
preempting those policies in favor of no policy at all or a uniform state
policy. 343
338. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 5, at 975–83 (describing renewed scholarly debates in light
of political polarization at the state level and preemption battles between states and local
governments); supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text.
339. See Davidson, supra note 5, at 976–78 (discussing scholarship and stating that “these
strands of the critique of localism coalesce into an overriding concern with a particularly toxic vein
of local parochialism that hardens a range of socioeconomic and racial inequalities”); Briffault,
supra note 7, at 1 (“Localism reflects territorial economic and social inequalities and reinforces
them with political power.”).
340. Davidson, supra note 5, at 980–81 (citing scholarship and noting that states “have become
unreliable arbiters of the normal and legitimate oversight functions they have traditionally
undertaken in less polarized times” due to “sophisticated partisan gerrymandering” that has
resulted in state politics that “structurally marginalize their urban residents in particular”); see
also Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Miriam Seifter, The Democracy Principle in State Constitutions, 119
MICH. L. REV. 859, 862 (2021) (“Recent years have seen a rash of [state] antidemocratic behavior
across the country—efforts to thwart popular majority rule that have nothing to do with protecting
vulnerable minorities or individual rights.”).
341. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 5, at 979–80 (summarizing arguments in favor of local
control); Heather K. Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, DEMOCRACY, no. 24, Spring 2012,
https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/24/a-new-progressive-federalism/ [https://perma.cc/L8A9AFMW] (“Eliminating opportunities for local governance to protect racial minorities and
dissenters also means eliminating the very sites where they are empowered to rule.”); supra notes
16–18, 27, and accompanying text.
342. See supra Part I.B.
343. See supra Part I.A.
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But what do the debates over localism look like when it comes to
local energy projects such as distributed solar, wind energy projects, or
related infrastructure? In this context, parochialism often takes the
form of NIMBYism—people are in favor of renewable energy
development but not in their own communities because of aesthetic and
other potential adverse impacts. 344 Energy and environmental law
scholars have long lamented the practice of local governments
restricting or banning rooftop solar, wind farms, and other critical
energy projects needed to address climate change and support a clean
energy transition. 345 In some cases, states have acted to preempt local
government authority to ban or restrict certain renewable energy
projects, addressing the same parochialism concerns local government
scholars have warned of for decades in nonenergy contexts. 346 In other
cases, renewable energy developers offer tax benefits or other economic
benefits to obtain community acceptance of projects. 347
There is evidence, however, that these energy parochialism
concerns can also be addressed through community ownership of new
projects. It is one thing for a community to oppose a new energy project
344. See, e.g., Robert Bryce, Warren Buffett’s Iowa Wind Power Expansion Derailed by the
Bridges
of
Madison
County,
FORBES
(Jan.
13,
2021),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertbryce/2021/01/13/iowa-wind-expansion-derailed-by-thebridges-of-madison-county/?sh=3bdff717a0ce
[https://perma.cc/YUS7-PMV6]
(discussing
increasing number of local government restrictions on renewable energy projects across the
country).
345. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, What Happens When the Green New Deal Meets the
Old Green Laws?, 44 VT. L. REV. 693, 713 (2020) (“Local NIMBY opposition has been a prominent
battleground. Commercial-scale solar and wind power projects, which take up large areas and are
highly visible, have enjoyed no ‘halo effect’ at the local level.” (footnote omitted)); Troy A. Rule,
Renewable Energy and the Neighbors, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 1223, 1223 (stating that neighboring
landowner opposition to renewable energy projects leads to “zoning ordinances and subdivision
covenants in communities throughout the country [that] restrict or prohibit the installation of
green energy devices” (footnote omitted)); Hannah J. Wiseman, Taxing Local Energy Externalities,
96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 563, 572–73, 581–84, 589–92, 616–18 (2020) (discussing power of local
governments to block renewable energy projects and ways to address that opposition, including
tax benefits for local governments and state preemption of local regulatory authority); see also
Amy J. Wildermuth, Is Environmental Law a Barrier to Emerging Alternative Energy Sources?, 46
IDAHO L. REV. 509 (2020) (discussing the extent to which existing environmental laws pose barriers
to clean energy development).
346. See Rule, supra note 345, at 1248–54 (discussing state preemption of local government
restrictions on renewable energy projects but cautioning against such a “one-size-fits-all” approach
that ignores local concerns); Wiseman, supra note 345, at 591–92 (discussing state preemption);
Uma Outka, The Renewable Energy Footprint, 30 STAN. ENV’T L. REV. 248, 278–79 (2011) (same);
see also Briffault, supra note 7, at 6 (discussing need for state oversight to address local
government parochialism).
347. See Rule, supra note 345, at 1267–76; Wiseman, supra note 345, at 594–602; see also
Ignacio Herrera Anchustegui, Distributive Justice, Community Benefits and Renewable Energy:
Offshore Wind Projects, in SUSTAINABLE ENERGY DEMOCRACY AND THE LAW 214 (Ruven Fleming,
Kaisa Huhta & Leonie Reins eds., 2020) (discussing community benefits agreements and payments
in Northern Europe for offshore wind projects).
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proposed by an outside developer or an investor-owned utility that will
be planned, built, and operated with little, if any, local ownership or
involvement. It is quite another matter when the local government
itself plans and staffs the project and the employees come from the local
community. These projects provide exciting opportunities for local
governments to engage in clean energy development in ways that
involve the entire community and integrate energy justice and racial
justice priorities.
For example, Fayetteville, North Carolina, became home to the
first municipal community solar farm in the state in 2019, which was
built to create “long-term sustainable growth, community growth, and
economic development.” 348 Austin, Texas, has planned a new
community solar array close to the city, creating clean energy jobs for
its citizens. 349 The Red Lake Nation’s solar arrays discussed above were
financed through crowdfunding, a first for solar installations in
Minnesota, demonstrating the enthusiasm for renewable projects with
community-tailored benefits. 350 The Standing Rock Sioux Tribe’s SAGE
Development Authority in North Dakota launched a similar
crowdfunding initiative to build a 235-megawatt wind farm which will
embody their “cultural values by prioritizing people, land, and nature
over profit.” 351
Moreover, the argument that local governments are in a superior
position to innovate and experiment with policy initiatives is
particularly true in the context of municipal utilities. As noted earlier,
not all municipal utilities have always embraced clean energy. Instead,
many of them have made heavy use of coal-fired power for decades
because it was often the lowest cost option. Today, however, with wind
348. Fayetteville Public Works Commission’s Community Solar Farm the First Municipal
Community Solar Farm in North Carolina, N.C. CLEAN ENERGY TECH. CTR. (Oct. 25, 2019),
https://nccleantech.ncsu.edu/2019/10/25/fayetteville-public-works-commissions-community-solarfarm-the-first-municipal-community-solar-farm-in-north-carolina/
[https://perma.cc/E9X6QQBC].
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ENERGY
(Aug.
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https://austinenergy.com/ae/about/news/news-releases/2020/construction-begins-on-pflugervillesolar-project-edging-austin-energy-closer-to-renewable-energy-goals
[https://perma.cc/L5BBXNFM].
350. Jossi, supra note 39.
351. SAGE Development Authority Launches Crowdfunding Initiative Seeking Critical Phase
One Support for New 235-Megawatt Wind Farm to Benefit the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, GLOBE
NEWSWIRE
(Oct.
2,
2020),
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Oct. 15, 2021) [https://perma.cc/N9WX-VMKU].
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and solar energy the lowest cost forms of energy, local utilities have
been able to pivot more quickly than communities without their own
utilities and embrace cleaner, less expensive energy resources. 352 This
is true not only in historically progressive cities with municipal utilities
like Los Angeles or Seattle but also medium and smaller cities with a
history of fossil fuel reliance like Kodiak Island, Alaska, which
transitioned from diesel to 100% renewable energy years ahead of its
2020 goal. 353 In a remarkable story of transformation, the conservative
town of Greensburg, Kansas, rebuilt itself as a model of sustainability,
powered entirely by wind, after 95% of the town was destroyed by a
tornado in 2007. 354 The municipal utility serving Lincoln, Nebraska has
rapidly cut its carbon emissions by 42% in the past decade and aims to
be at net zero emissions by 2040, a significant reversal of its past
reliance on coal. 355 These examples provide a new perspective on
localism debates and energy parochialism that may be helpful as the
nation attempts to accomplish a clean energy transition that will
require buy-in from communities across the country.
CONCLUSION
This Article provides a new perspective on local power. While
local governments cannot address climate change, racial justice, or
economic inequality on their own, their efforts to use their regulatory
powers to innovate in these areas are well documented. On the other
hand, local government regulatory power is subject to significant limits
352. The notable accomplishment of being the first city to be powered entirely by renewable
energy belongs to Burlington, Vermont, which has had its own municipal electric utility since 1905.
Colin Woodard, America’s First All-Renewable-Energy City, POLITICO MAG. (Nov. 17, 2016),
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(May 20, 2015), https://www.ecowatch.com/second-largest-island-in-u-s-goes-100-renewable1882043985.html [https://perma.cc/KU5P-6DCL].
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if state legislatures wish to make different policy choices. As political
polarization increases, state-local policy conflicts have resulted in
states engaging in aggressive preemption of local government policies,
reducing community-based innovation and autonomy. However, when
local governments act in their proprietary capacity as municipal
utilities, there is a significant opportunity to pursue a broad range of
energy justice, energy democracy, and community-engaged projects
that can help achieve many of the same environmental, economic, and
social equity objectives. Thus, municipal utilities’ long-standing role as
proprietary actors can create a potential safe harbor against the statelocal preemption battles taking place on the regulatory front. Moreover,
the analysis in this Article sheds a new light on the renewed debates
over localism. In the energy context, the parochialism concerns raised
by local government scholars in other contexts often take the form of
local objections to renewable energy projects critical to a U.S. clean
energy transition. Here too, municipal utilities can play an important
role in ensuring that the economic and social benefits of these projects,
not only the costs, remain in the community and are consistent with
energy justice and energy democracy principles.

